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The Vector Autoregressive (VAR) Models can be considered as a dynamic
multivariate extension of the univariate autoregressive models. This family of
models has become very popular in macroeconomics analysis after the work of
Sims(1980) and they are widely used in time series literature thanks to their
flexibility. As a matter of fact, by setting appropriately a VAR model, we can
describe efficiently the dynamics of the economy and provide quite accurate
forecasts.
During recent years, researchers developed different VAR models with the
purpose to represent better the data generating process. Among these, the
nonlinear VAR models have gained a central role in macroeconometric analysis
in testing the theory, due to their capacity to capture a richer set of dynamics
regarding current macroeconomic phenomenons. Depending on the specific
model, they can allow, for example, different states (regimes) of the world, to
allow the coefficients of the model to vary over time in each time unit, allowing
for interactions between variables potentially revealing important information.
The first paper included in this thesis is a survey which have the purpose to
examine linear and nonlinear VAR models.
The second and third papers present two empirical applications of the
Interacted Panel VAR Model, which is a new nonlinear methodology we il-
lustrated over the first paper. Specifically, we analyze in both papers the
behavior of government spending multiplier when the interest rate is at the
Zero Lower Bound (ZLB). This is a highly topical question since the outbreak
of Great Recession, given that many policy makers have wondered whether
fiscal stimulus would be able to help the economy to recover from recession. In
particular, there exist two different and opposite theoretical predictions. New
Keynesian DSGE models show that, when the interest rate is at the ZLB, a
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raise in government spending has a strong and positive impact on the economy.
On the other side, theoretical prediction indicate very low multipliers, showing
that an increase in government spending does not stimulate private activity.
Although there exist many theoretical predictions about the size of go-
vernment spending multiplier at the ZLB, very few empirical evidences are
provided. These two paper aim to shed light on the size of the government
spending multiplier at the ZLB. Among the nonlinear VAR models, we choose
the Interacted (Panel) VAR Model because it offers an important advantage
compared to others nonlinear approaches. Thanks to the interaction term, we
are able to investigate among the entire sample. This can be done also within
a time varying framework, but it implies a larger number of estimates which
requires informative priors. In order to be as more agnostic as possible, we
also use a Bayesian approach for inference but with uninformative priors.
In the first paper we develop an Interacted VAR Model and conduct our
analysis on the United States sample. In order to identify government spending
shocks we use the sign restrictions approach, furthermore we use the forecast
series of government spending to account for the potential effects of antici-
pation that can pose serious problems for the identification of government
spending shocks. We find that the government spending multiplier ranges
between 3.4 and 3.7 at the ZLB, while it ranges from 1.5 to 2.7 away from
the ZLB. Then, we develop a Factor-Augmented IVAR (FAIVAR) model with
the purpose to address another limited information problem. It confirms our
results from a qualitatively point of view. As a matter of fact, the government
spending multiplier ranges between 2.0 and 2.1 at the ZLB and between 1.5
and 1.8 away from the ZLB. These results are also in line with some recent
studies which predict higher multipliers at the ZLB than in normal times.
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In the second paper, we extend our analysis to the Euro Area countries
by developing an Interacted Panel VAR Model (IPVAR). Also in this paper,
we identify government spending shocks using sign restriction, and use the
European Commission forecast of government spending to account for fiscal
foresight. We find higher multipliers for times when we are away from the
ZLB: the government spending multiplier ranges between 0.33 and 0.88 in
the low interest rate state, while it ranges between 1.10 and 1.29 in the
high interest rate state. However,we consider a Factor-Augmented IPVAR
framework (FAIPVAR), we find that the government spending multiplier at
the ZLB is very similar to multipliers computed in normal times, ranging
between 1.08 and 1.41 at the ZLB and between 1.26 and 1.39 away from the
ZLB. Next, we divide our sample into two groups of countries with high and
low levels of debt-to-GDP ratio. The purpose of this exercise is to understand
if the size of the government spending multiplier is influenced by the level
of debt-to-GDP ratio. Considering, from our point of view, the more reliable
specification with factors that contains a richer set of information, we find that
if the debt-to-GDP ratio is low, the government spending multiplier is higher
than multipliers computed when the debt-to-GDP is high.
Results for both papers are in line with New Keynesian DSGE models
predictions, showing that a one unit shock of government spending raises GDP
by more than 1%. In case of the US sample, we find that the government
spending multipliers are larger when the interest rate is at the ZLB. On the
other hand, the EA sample would not seem to support the latter result. Our in-
terpretation is that, the EA findings may be influenced by a subset of countries
that experienced high level of debt (especially during the crisis), which we have
found to have depressive effect on the multipliers and which might be stronger
than the positive effect exerted by the favorable conditions illustrated in some
iii
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theoretical models at the ZLB. Overall, we argue that a raise in government
spending might be a useful additional instrument for policymakers to solve
deep recessions, when monetary policy is at the ZLB, although the effect
produced by unconventional monetary policies have currently shown to be
more difficult to identify.
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1. A survey on Linear and Nonlinear Vector Autoregressive Models
Introduction
Starting from the work of Sims (1980), Vector Autoregressive (VAR) Models
have proven to be useful instruments to capture the dynamic relationships
between variables and to provide quite accurate economic forecast. A VAR
model is a system of simultaneous equations where the endogenous variables
are regressed on their own lags and lags of the other endogenous variables.
Moreover, it allows us to study the impact of innovations in one variable in
the system and therefore on all the endogenous variables. This survey has the
aim to give an insight into linear and nonlinear VAR time series analysis.
Section 1.1 analyzes the characteristic of linear VAR models. We describe
how to approximate correctly the data generating process using a reduced-form
VAR model. Here, is crucial to specify correctly the VAR model by properly
choosing variables, lag order and eventually modelling breaks. Then we il-
lustrate the estimation procedures with classical least squares and Bayesian
methods. We conclude the discussion about reduced form VAR analysis by
describing in section 1.1.5 the various strategy to check if our VAR model is
subject to misspecifications.
Next, we discuss how to recover the structural VAR innovations starting
from the estimated reduced form parameters. Specifically, through section
1.1.6, we illustrates the identification strategies necessary to recover structural
parameters. Here, the economic theory play an important role and help us
to set the restrictions necessary to recover the structural VAR model. Spe-
cifically, we describe three type of restrictions: short-run restrictions, log-run
restrictions and sign restrictions.
Section 1.1.6.3 illustrates how to compute impulse responses functions
starting from the residuals of the structural form. Moreover, in section 1.1.9,
2
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we illustrate also the procedure to recover the generalized impulse response
functions, which are obtained without imposing constraints on the reduced
form VAR model.
The second part of this survey is focused on the analysis of nonlinear VAR
models. As a matter of fact, it can be the case that a standard linear VAR
cannot explain well the relationship between the variables of interest. The use
of nonlinear VAR models can be suggested by theory or more simply by the
observed time series. For example, suppose that we want to compute the fiscal
multiplier associated to a government spending shock. The results we would
get can depend on whether we are in expansionionary or recessionary phase of
the business cycle. In this case, a nonlinear VAR should perform better than
standard VAR models. Through section 1.2, we illustrate regime-switching
models like Threshold VAR and Smooth Transitions VAR, and the Interacted
VAR model.1
1.1 Linear Vector Autoregressive Analysis
The Vector Autoregression Model (VAR)2 is the most common way used to
summarize information about comovement among variables. Specifically, it
captures the dynamics interdependencies among multiple time series. It is
composed by n equation and n variables, where every variable is explained by
its own lagged value and (possibly) current and past values of the other n - 1
variables. For example, considering only two variables yt and zt:
yt = b10 − b12zt + γ11yt−1 + γ12zt−1 + εyt (1.1)
1This survey is not aimed at covering all possible nonlinear VAR specifications. We only
present the ones that we retains as the most important.
2Introduced by Sims (1980)
3
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zt = b20 − b21yt + γ21yt−1 + γ22zt−1 + εzt (1.2)
where εyt and εzt have standard deviations equal to σy and σz respectively,
and {εyt} and {εzt} are white-noise disturbances. Moreover εyt and εzt are
pure innovations or shocks to yt and zt.
The system above constitutes the structural form of a first-order vector
autoregression (VAR). As we can see, the two variables affect each other
directly through b12, b21, γ12, γ21 and indirectly through the error terms.






















 , xt =
 yt
zt
 , Γ0 =
 b10
b20







 we can rewrite 3 as:
Bxt = Γ0 + Γ1xt−1 + εt (1.4)
premultiplying equation 1.4 by B−1:
xt = A0 + A1xt−1 + et (1.5)
where A0 = B−1Γ0, A1 = B−1Γ1, et = B−1εt.
Equation 1.5 represents the VAR in reduced form, where the error term
are:
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They have zero means, constant variances and are individually serially
uncorrelated.
Moreover, they incorporates both shocks εyt, εzt. The variance-covariance






1.1.1 Stability and Stationarity
A stochastic process is called stationary if its mean and variance are time
invariant. It means that the time series tend to return to their means and their
fluctuations around the mean have constant amplitude. In a VAR context:
yt = a10 + a11yt−1 + a12zt−1 + e1t
zt = a20 + a21yt−1 + a22zt−1 + e2t
(1.9)
we can rewrite the reduced form using lag operators:
(1− a11L)yt = a10 + a12Lzt + e1t
(1− a22L)zt = a20 + a21Lzt + e2t
(1.10)





1. A survey on Linear and Nonlinear Vector Autoregressive Models
to have the stability condition satisfied, the roots of the polynomial (1 −
a11L)(1− a22L)− a12a21L2 must lie outside the unit circle.
1.1.2 Specification
1.1.2.1 Choosing variables and lags
Usually the choice of variables of interest are based on institutional knowledge
and/or theoretical models. For example DSGE model can give good advice on
which variables to include in a VAR. In theory, we can include all variables we
need in our VAR. However, adding variables means loosing degree of freedom
making our estimates more imprecise. The same happens for lags: choosing
long lag length will erodes degrees of freedom. Specifically, we need to estimate
np parameters plus intercept - where n are the number of variables, p the lag
length - which have to be less than number of observations T . It is generally
inopportune to add to each equation more than T/3 parameters, thus we
should impose the following constraint:
3np < T (1.12)
On the other hand, if we choose short lag length, we could incur in misspefi-
cation problems due to the fact that we might not fully capture the persistence
of the variables considered. Economic theory can help us to choose the right
lag length, otherwise we could use statistical criteria.
The likelihood ratio test, compares the residuals of two VAR with same
variables but different lag length. Following Sims (1980), we compare the
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where T is the number of observations, c is the number of parameters
estimated in each equation of the unrestricted system, ln |∑u| is the natural
logarithm of the determinant of the variance-covariance matrix of the un-
restricted model, ln |∑r| is the natural logarithm of the determinant of the
variance-covariance matrix of the restricted model.
The above statistic is asymptotically distributed as a χ2 which have degrees
of freedom equal to the number of restrictions. Given the significance level, if
the value of this statistic is less than the value of χ2 we cannot reject the null
hypothesis and therefore we choose the restricted model.
It is also possible to choose different lag lengths for each variable in our VAR
model. In this way, we obtain an unbalanced VAR, named near-VAR.3 Thus,
if the equation of the unrestricted model have a different number of regressors,
c represents the maximum number of regressors of the longest equation.
The likelihood ratio test is applicable only if we have nested models. Mo-
reover, since it is based on asymptotic theory, it is not advisable when we
have a small sample. The AIC and SBC can be considered as alternatives to
likelihood ratio test:
AIC = T ln
∣∣∣∑∣∣∣+ 2N (1.14)
SBC = T ln
∣∣∣∑∣∣∣+N ln(T ) (1.15)
where |∑| is the determinant of variance/covariance matrix of residuals
and N is the total number of parameters estimated in all equations. In this
case we will choose the model which have the minimum value of AIC or SBC.
3In this case, it is important to highlight that OLS estimates are not efficient. We should
estimates the VAR coefficients using seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR).
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1.1.2.2 Granger Causality
The Granger Causality test is a test of causality which determines if the current
and past values of one variable are useful to forecast the future value of another
variable. In practice, we want to know if the lag and current value of one







































where Ai0 are the intercept terms, Aij(L) are polynomials in lag operator
L which are denoted by aij(1), aij(2)..., the terms eit are white-noise distur-
bances. The Granger causality test states that the variable j does not Granger
cause variable i if Aij(L) = 0.
Considering a model with only two variables with p lags, {yt} does not
Granger cause {zt} if A21(L) = 0. To test this hypothesis we can use an F-test
on the following restriction:
a21(1) = a21(2) = a21(3) = . . . = a21(p) = 0 (1.17)
It is important to note that we can use the F-test only if all variables in
the VAR are stationary. Alternatively, if for example {yt} is I (1 ) and {zt} is
I (0 ), we can use a t-test. If instead, all variables are in first differences we can
use both f-test and t-test.
8
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1.1.3 Classical Estimation






































where Ai0 are the intercept terms, Aij(L) are polynomials in lag operator L
which are denoted by aij(1), aij(2)..., the terms eit are white-noise disturbances.
We can write it out in a more compact way:
xt = [A0, A1, A2 . . . , Ap]Zt−1 + et (1.19)
where xt is a vector of n elements which contains all variables included
in the VAR, A0 is a n × 1 intercepts vector, A1 . . . Ap are the coefficients,
Zt−1 = (1, x1t−1, x2t−1,. . . , xnt−1)′ and et is a n× 1 error terms vector.
We can efficiently estimate n+ pn2 parameters equation by equation using
OLS. If the process {xt} is normally distributed and ut ∼ N(0, Σu) we would
obtain the same results adopting the maximum likelihood estimator.
Moreover, given that no restrictions on the parameters are imposed, the
estimator is also identical to GLS estimator and it is equal to:










In the case of non-stationary variables, Sims (1980) and Sims et al. (1990)
advice to not differencing, because it causes the lost of important information
about the comovements among the data. Thus, we can still use OLS or
9
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ML estimator, which continue to be asymptotically normal under general
conditions.4
1.1.4 Bayesian Estimation
An issue of VAR models is that they generally involve many variables and
consequently many parameters to estimate. Moreover, in many macroeconomic
applications some assumptions made on VAR models become somehow unrea-
listic. For example, considering VAR coefficients constant over time means that
the relationship between variables remains constant along time, which might
be a strong assumption.5 Moreover, the volatility of some macroeconomic
variables might be not constant over time, and this can be accomodated by
allowing the error covariance matrix to change over time.
Although a researcher would prefer to use time-varying VAR Models be-
cause of their realism, he has to deal with problem related to over - paramete-
rization. Bayesian estimation, through the introduction of prior information,
shrink parameters and so it reduce over-parameterization problems. Bayesian
methods consist of conditioning β to a prior distribution of ∑e (e.g. p(β|Σe)).
Combining the likelihood function with the prior distribution, we obtain the
posterior distribution of β.
The Bayes’ rule is represented by equation:
p(θ|γ) = p(γ|θ)p (θ)
p (γ) (1.20)
where p denotes the probability distribution, θ collect the parameters that
we want to estimate, γ collect the available data that we use for the esti-
4see Park and Phillips (1988, 1989); Sims et al. (1990); Lütkepohl (2005).
5In Section 1.2 we focus on some nonlinear VAR model where parameters are allowed to
vary over time.
10
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mation. p(θ|γ) represents the posterior distribution, which is the conditional
distribution of parameters θ given the data γ. p(γ|θ) represents the likelihood
function, which is equivalent to the conditional distribution of the data γ given
the parameters θ. p (γ) is the marginal likelihood ad it is equal to the integral
of the joint distribution of the parameters and data:
p (γ) =
ˆ
p(γ|θ)p (θ) dθ (1.21)
Since the marginal likelihood is a constant, we can conclude that:
p(θ|γ)  L(θ; γ)p(θ) (1.22)
The term p (θ) is the prior distribution, which is the marginal distribution
of the parameters θ. It represents the belief that the researcher have about
the parameters. Imposing an uninformative prior distribution means that we
have no prior belief about parameters, on the other hand imposing a strong
prior means that we have strong belief about the probability distribution of
parameters.
Consider now a basic VAR equation:
yt = A0 + A1yt−1 + . . .+ Apyt−p + et (1.23)
where A0 is a N × 1 vector denoting the constant term, A1, . . . ,Apare
N × N matrix of autoregressive coefficients and et is the error component
which is normally distributed with zero mean and covariance matrix equal to
Σ.
Denoting a vector K×1 (where K = 1+pN), which pick up all data found
in the right hand side of equation 1.23, such that xt = (1, yt−1, . . . , yt−k).
11
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Collecting the intercept term and the autoregressive matrices in a K × N
matrix, such that A = (A0, A1, . . . , Ap). We can rewrite equation 1.23 as:
y′t = x′tA+ e′t (1.24)
Considering the vectors y′t, x′t and e′t all periods T, we denote Υ = (y1, y2, . . ., yT )′
with dimension T× N, X = (x1, x2, . . . , xT )′ with dimension T×K, U =
(e1, e2, . . . , eT )′ with dimension T× N, we can write equation 1.24 as:
Υ = XA+ U (1.25)
where the error term matrix U is conditionally independently normally
distributed and follow a matric-variate normal distribution, which have zero
mean and covariance matrix equal to Σ :
U ∼MN T N(0T N ,Σ, IT ) (1.26)
where 0T N is a T ×N matrix, and It is an identity matrix of order T which
represents the coloumn-specific covariance matrix.
Thus, the conditional distribution of Υ follow a normal-Wishart distribu-
tion:
Υ|A,Σ ∼MN T N(XA,Σ, It) (1.27)
which results from the combination of equation 1.24 and 1.26.
The likelihood function will be equal to:
12
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where Â = (X ′X)−1X ′Υ is the least squares estimator of A.
Thus we can conclude that the likelihood function follow a normal-Wishart
distribution, which have the following parameters:







, T −K −N − 1
) (1.30)
As is clear, priors are very important to determine the posterior distri-
bution: they influence the VAR coefficients, drawing them away from OLS
estimates, to the prior mean. There exists a rich bouquet of priors for different
purpose. For example, one would set a specific prior: to reflect general
properties of macroeconomic time series, for fast computations, to have good
forecast performance, to achieve good flexibility in the model, and so on.
Furthermore, to derive posterior and predictive densities, we can distin-
guish between priors for which we can derive results analytically and priors
which require Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) methods, such as Gibbs
sampler. In order to illustrate the procedure to recover analytically the pos-
terior distribution, we introduce one of the most used prior which is the
13
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natural-conjugate prior distribution. The main characteristic of this prior is
that the density of the posterior distribution is the same of prior distribution,
on the other hand it is important to highlight that this type of prior does not
allow restriction on parameters.
Thus, if we assume a normal-Wishart prior distribution we would have:
A|Σ ∼MNKN (A,Σ, V )
Σ ∼ IWN(S, v)
(1.31)
where A is the prior mean of A, V is proportional to its column-specific
covariance matrix, S is the scale matrix of the inverse Wishart prior distri-
bution for Σ , and v is degree of freedom parameter. These terms are called
hyper-parameters, and are specified by the researcher.
Thus, the joint prior distribution would be:
p(A,Σ) = p(A|Σ)p(Σ) (1.32)














To get the posterior distribution we have to substitute the likelihood function
and the prior distribution in the kernel of the posterior distribution. Thus, we
substitute equation 1.29 and 1.33 into equation equation 1.22:
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Therefore, the conditional posterior distribution of A given Σ and Υ and
the marginal posterior distribution of Σ can be written as:
p(A,Σ|Υ) = p(A|Υ,Σ)p(Σ|Υ) (1.35)
where p(A|Υ,Σ) and p(Σ|Υ) follow a matric-variate distribution and a
inverse Wishart distribution, respectively.
A|Υ,Σ ∼MNKN(A,Σ, V )





V −1 +X ′X
)−1
A = V (V −1A+X ′Υ)
v = v + T
S = S + Υ′Υ + A′V −1A− A′V −1A
(1.37)
The mean of the posterior distribution of A would be:
A = V V −1A+ V X ′XÂ = Ω1AΩ2Â (1.38)
where Ω1 = V V −1 and Ω2 = V X ′X. As we can see, the mean posterior
distribution is a linear combination of the prior mean A and the OLS estimates
of Â. Note that if we impose a uninformative prior distribution, by setting the
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diagonal elements of V to infinity, we simply obtain the the OLS estimates of
Â. On the other hand, if we impose a strong prior, which assign probability
equal to 1 to the prior mean and zero probability to OLS estimates we have
that the posterior mean will be equal to A.
1.1.5 Model Diagnostic
Through this section we basically focus on the following question: does our
VAR Model represent appropriately the data generating process of the system
of variables? Here, we illustrate some useful tests to answer this important
question: test for autocorrelation, test for nonnormality, conditional hetero-
skedasticity test and the test for parameters time invariance.
1.1.5.1 Test for Autocorrelation
As we have seen the choice of lag order is a crucial point to set appropriately
our VAR model, specifically we should set a lag order which approximately
satisfy one of our basic assumption: resulting reduced form residuals are not







i = 1 , 2 , . . ..













6= 0 for i = 1 , 2 , . . .















where Ĉj = T−1ΣTt=j+1êtê′t−j, h is the number of autocovariance terms, p is
the lag order and êt are the estimated residuals. When the VAR is stationary,
there are no parameter restrictions and T and h are large, the distribution
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of Qh under the null hypothesis is approximated to a χ2(N2(h − p)). In
small sample it can be possible that the approximated χ2 distribution can
be different from the actual distribution. For this reason, Hosking (1980)
suggested to use a modified statistic:
















As suggested in Lütkepohl (2005) if we have imposed parameter restrictions
in our VAR, we have to adjust degrees of freedom. Specifically, it would be
equal to the difference between the number of autocovariances included in the
statistic, i.e. N 2 h, and the number of parameter estimated in our VAR.
Moreover, it is important to highlight that h should be much larger than
p. Thus, to ensure the powerful of the test, we should test for a large number
of autocovariances. If instead, we want to test for a small number of autoco-
variance, it is advisable to use the LM test proposed by Breusch (1978) and
Godfrey (1978). Consider an auxiliary model:
êt = v + A1yt−1 + . . .+ Apyt−p +D1êt−1 + . . .+Dhêt−h + u∗t (1.41)
where êt are the estimated residuals of a VAR model of order p, u∗t is an
auxiliary error term and the values of êt with t ≤ 0 are replaced with zero.
We want to test the null hypothesis H0: D1 + . . .+ Dh = 0 against the
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t . The LM statistic is distributed as a χ2 (hN 2 ) under the null
hypothesis of no autocorrelation. Brüggemann et al. (2006) show that the
asymptotic distribution is valid also when there are integrated variables.
1.1.5.2 Test for Nonnormality
Normality of residuals and observed variables is not a strong requirement
for VAR modelling. On the other hand, if we find that the distribution of
the observations is not normal we can increase efficiency of our model by
considering other estimation procedures. Furthermore, if residuals do not have
a normal distribution, it can be considered as a sign of other potential problem
in our model, e.g. very large residuals.
As an illustration, we describe the normality test developed by Lomnicki
(1961) and Jarque and Bera (1987) , which analyses the third and the fourth
moment of the residuals and check if they are compatible with normal distri-
bution. DecomposingΣ̃e such that Σ̃e = PP ′ and analyze the skewness and
kurtosis of the standardized residuals êst = P−1 êt .6
Consider the vector b̂j =
(
b̂1j , . . . , b̂Nj
)′
where b̂nj = 1T Σ
T
t=1 (êsnt)j for j =3, 4.















6To decompose Σ̃e, we follow Lütkepohl (2005) and use a Cholesky decomposition. This
approach is described in details in 1.1.6.1.
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where 3N = (3, . . . , 3)′ is a N× 1 vector. We use equation 1.43 and 1.44 to
test for the symmetry of the distribution and for excess kurtosis, respectively.
1.1.5.3 Conditional Heteroskedasticity Test
Providing that the unconditional error variances are finite, the presence of
conditional heteroskedacity of the errors might invalidate consistency of the
VAR slope parameters. On the other hand, it weaken the efficiency of the
estimator and violate the assumption of i.i.d. errors. Furthermore it can be
possible that the errors dynamics may make the fourth moment infinite and
consequently complicate the inference procedures.
In order to test for conditional heteroskedasticity we can use once again an




















where vech is an operator that converts the columns of the matrix from the
main diagonal downwards into a column vector, êt are the estimated residuals
of a VAR model of order p and u∗t is an auxiliary error term.
We want to test the following hypothesis:
H0: D1 + . . .+ Dh = 0
H1 : Di 6= 0 for at least one iε {1, . . . , q}
The associated statistic is:
LMARCH(q) =
1
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where Ω̂ and Ω̂0 are the residuals of the model described in equation 1.45
when q > 0 and q = 0, respectively. The LM statistic can be approximated to
a χ2
(
qN 2 (N+1 )24
)
.7
1.1.5.4 Test for Parameters Time Invariance
We have already seen stability requirements for VAR modelling in 1.1.1. We
now focus on the possibility to have changes in parameter values over time.
This is an important stationary requirement in a standard VAR analysis, as
a matter of fact changes of parameters over time may implicate violation of
stability condition.
One of the most used test to check parameter stability over time, is the
Chow test. This is substantially a test for structural change, where the null
hypothesis is the time invariance of parameters, while the alternative one is a
change in parameters value which occurs at a given point in time.
Suppose that we have approximately individuate a date TB when the break
occurs. Let’s divide the full sample T into two subsamples T1 and T2 ,
such that T1 < T2 and T2 ≤ T − TB. We can construct a Likelihood-ratio
test which compares the maximum of the likelihood obtained in the constant
parameter model with its counterpart obtained when we allow for different
parameter values.



















7In finite sample, we can get approximation of critical value using bootstrap procedures.
Furthermore, to offset the loose of power of this test in finite sample, we can test each
equation for GARCH as an alternative. For further details see Lütkepohl (2005) .
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where lt is the conditional log-density of i th observation vector and it is
equal to lt = logft (yt|yt−1, . . . , y−p+1).
The statistic described in equation 1.47 is distributed under the null hypot-
hesis as a χ2 distribution, which have degrees of freedom equal to the difference
between the total number of the free coefficients estimated in the two subsam-
ple and the number of free coefficients in the full sample.
When we don’t know exactly the date of the break, or the break is quite
plain we may drop some observations from the two subsamples. This operation
has also the effect to improve the power of the test in small samples. We should
also pay attention to the fact that in small samples the structural change tests
may reject the null even if the null is true. This can be explained by the fact
that the tests are unable to distinguish between permanent breaks and large
transitory dynamics. For this reason, we need to be careful when we interpret
the results of tests like Chow test.
1.1.6 Identification
Suppose now the we have estimated our reduced form VAR model and we want
to recover the structural form in equation 1.1 and 1.2. The problem we face
is that zt and yt are correlated with the error terms εyt and εzt, respectively.
Since the regressors are clearly correlated with error term, we cannot estimate
equation 1.1 and 1.2 directly. On the other hand, we can estimate the reduced
form VAR model by using OLS and through some appropriate restrictions get
the parameters in structural form.
We need some restrictions because the model written in equation 1.1 and 1.2
is underidentified. To make it clear, consider the reduced-form from equation
1.9. We need to estimate 10 parameters in the structural equation (b10, b20,
γ11, γ12, γ21, γ22, b12, b21, σy and σz), but we can estimate only nine parameters
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in the reduced-form equation ( the coefficients a10, a20, a11, a12, a21, a22,the
variance var(e1t), var(e2t) and the covariance cov(e1t, e2t)).
Consider now the VAR described in equation 1.5:
xt = A0 + A1xt−1 + et (1.48)
we can write the variance-covariance matrix of residuals of our VAR as:








since we know that Σε = I we can conclude that
Σe = B−1B−1
′ (1.50)
As it is clear, to reach identification we need to know the matrix B−1. As
a matter of fact, knowing that A1 = B−1Γ1 and et = B−1εt we can recover the
structural form:
Bxt = Γ0 + Γ1xt−1 + εt (1.51)































from equation 1.52 we want to derive a system of equation, where we have 9
unknowns, which are the elements of B−1, and only 6 equations (because of the
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symmetry of Σe). For this reason our system is not identified, and we need to
impose some restriction to recover the matrix B−1. There are different method
to reach identification of the structural form parameters. We illustrates three
type of approaches: Cholesky, Blanchard Quah and Sign restriction.
1.1.6.1 Zero Short-run restrictions

































The Cholesky decomposition is based on the assumption that εyt affects
contemporaneously all variables, εxt affects contemporaneously xt and zt, and
εzt affects contemporaneously only zt. In this way we are saying that e1t is
attributed only to shock to yt. Although this decomposition imposes a strong
asymmetry, it provides the minimal set of assumptions necessary to identify
structural model.
As it is clear, in this context the order of variables is very important and
usually it is driven by economic theory. Anyway, we have to be very careful,
because we are supposing that some variables have no contemporaneous effect
on the others.
This assumptions make the matrix B−1 lower triangular. Thus, we can
rewrite equation 1.53 as:
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Comparing this system with equation 1.52, now we have 6 unknowns and
6 equations and so we can revert from reduced form to structural form.
We reach identification through the Cholesky factorization of Σe. It is
based on the concept that a positive definite matrix X can be decomposed as














where P is an upper triangular matrix and so P′ is lower triangular.
Applying Cholesky factorization to Σe:
Σe = P ′P (1.55)
where P′ is a lower triangular matrix. Furthermore, we know from equation
1.50, that Σe = B−1B−1
′ and that B−1 is also lower triangular. Thus we can
conclude that P ′ = B−1
1.1.6.2 Zero long-run restrictions
An alternative way to zero short-run restrictions is to impose restrictions on
long-run responses of variables to a shock. This restrictions was developed by
Blanchard and Quah (1989), and allow the researcher to overcome the possible
dispute about the right short-run restrictions to impose, by focusing only on
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the long-run properties of the shock where there is generally more consensus
among economists.
Consider the following VAR model:
xt = Axt−1 +B−1εt (1.56)
where A = Γ1B−1. For simplicity, Suppose that a shock occurs at time t,
the cumulative long run impact on xt would be:
xt,t+∞ = B−1εt + AB−1εt + A2B−1εt + . . .+ A∞B−1εt (1.57)




AjB−1εt = (I − A)−1B−1εt = Dεt (1.58)
where the matrix D represents the cumulative effect of the shock εt on xt.
















Each term dij represents the cumulative long run impact of the shock on
our variables of interest, for example, d13 represents the cumulative long-run
impact of the shock εzt on xt
Going back to equation 1.58, we can write DD′ as:
DD′ = (I − A)−1B−1B−1′(I − A)−1′ (1.60)
from equation 1.50 we know that Σe = B−1B−1
′ , thus:
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DD′ = (I − A)−1Σe(I − A)−1
′ (1.61)
Remembering that to achieve identification we have to identify the matrix
B−1, we denote an upper triangular matrix P such that:
P ′P = (I − A)−1Σe(I − A)−1
′ (1.62)
Assuming that D is a lower triangular matrix, we can conclude that D = P ′
and consequently we can define B−1 as:
B−1 = (I − A)D (1.63)
1.1.6.3 Sign Restrictions
The sign restrictions approach was developed by Faust (1998), Canova and De
Nicolò (2002), and Uhlig (2005). It is an alternative approach which is not
based on exclusion restrictions as approaches described in section 1.5.1 and
1.5.2. Moreover, it can be much more easily derived from economic models in
comparison to alternative identification approaches.
Considering the Cholesky decomposition of Σe = P ′P , we want to find a
random squared orthogonal matrix S such that S ′S = I and consequently:
Σe = B−1B−1 = P ′S ′SP = P ′P (1.64)
We can construct orthogonal matrices using Givens rotation matrix. For
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where ϕ ranges from 0 and 2π, such that for each choice of ϕ we get an
orthogonal matrix S(ϕ).
As a result, the matrix P ′ is solution for the identification problem8:
B−1 = P ′ (1.66)
we can generate multiple candidate solution P ′ to the identification pro-
blem. Among these, we keep only those which generate a structural impact
multiplier which satisfy the theory-driven sign restrictions we imposed. In
other words, we find a matrix S which satisfy condition 1.64, we identify
structural form and find IRFs associated, than we retain them if they satisfy
our set of a priori restrictions. We replicate these procedure N times and
report the median impulse response function and its confidence intervals.
1.1.7 Impulse Response Function
















we can write the model above as a vector moving average (VMA) repre-
sentation, which enable us to understand what is the path of the variables














recalling equation 1.6 and 1.7, the error terms can be written as:
8Note that the matrix P ′ is not lower triangular anymore.
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 e1t
e2t
















































thus, the elements φjk(0) are the impact multipliers. If the sequence {yt}
is stationary, then as i approaches to infinity, the values of φjk(i) converge to
zero. This means that if the series is stationary the effect of the shock cannot
be permanent.
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since we know that at ith period the values of φjk(i) is zero, we can conclude
that the sum above is finite.
The elements φ11(i), φ12(i), φ21(i), φ22(i) are the impulse responses functions
(IRFs). They enable us to recover the path of the variables following a shock
εzt or εyt.
Thus, to compute IRFs we need to go back from the reduced to the struc-
tural form. On the other hand we know that the structural model is unde-
ridentified. Basically, it means that we have no way to go from the reduced
form to the structural form unless we set appropriate restriction.9
It is also important to highlight that, since the IRFs are constructed using
estimated coefficients, they enclose error due to parameter uncertainty. For this
reason we need to compute confidence intervals which reflect the imprecision
of the estimation process.
There exist different methods to computer error bands, we illustrate below
a Monte Carlo study for the following AR(p) process:
xt = a0 + a1xt−1 + . . .+ apxt−p + εt (1.74)
First of all we estimate the coefficients ai and the residuals εi. Then, we
generate bootstrap confidence intervals by randomly generating a T numbers
which represents the {εt} sequence. The series generated, say εst, have the same
properties of the true error process and can be used to construct a simulated
sequence {xst}:
xst = â0 + â1xst−1 + . . .+ âpxst−p + εst (1.75)
9Note that we have addressed in detail the identification problem in section 1.1.6.
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Now we estimate xst and store the IRFs associated. Than, we repeat the
process several times to construct the confidence interval. For example, if
we want the 95% confidence interval, we need to exclude the lowest and the
highest 2,5%.
If we want to apply this Monte Carlo study to a VAR, we need to remember
that in this model the regression residual are correlated. A strategy to get
around the problem in a two-variable VAR(1) - like the one described in
equation 1.9 - is to draw e1t while keeping fixed the value of e2t corresponding
to the same period.
1.1.8 Variance Decomposition
The forecast error variance decomposition is a good instrument to investigate
on the relationship between variables of our VAR.
Consider the VMA representation of the structural VAR expressed in equa-










the corresponding forecast error is:
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where xt+h is the actual realization of x at horizon t + h, Et [xt+h|It ] is the
forecasted value of x at horizon t + h and It represents the information about
xt and the other deterministic variables (if present) up to period t.
Coming back to the two-variables VAR written in equation 1.9 and con-
sidering only the {yt}sequence, we can write the n-step-ahead forecast error
as:
yt+h − Et [yt+h|It] = φ11(0)εyt+h + φ11(1)εyt+h−1 + . . .
. . .+ φ11(h− 1)εyt+1 + φ12(0)εzt+h + φ12(1)εzt+h−1 + . . .
. . .+ φ12(h− 1)εzt+1
(1.79)
Denoting the error variance of yt+h as σy(h)2:
σy(h)2 = σ2y [φ11(0)2 + φ11(1)2 + . . .+ φ11(h− 1)2] + . . .
. . .+ σ2z [φ12(0)2 + φ12(1)2 + . . .+ φ12(h− 1)2]
(1.80)
Then we can decompose the forecast error variance to investigate about
the proportion of σy(h)2 caused by the shock in {εyt}and {εzt}:
σ2y [φ11(0)2 + φ11(1)2 + . . .+ φ11(h− 1)2]
σy(h)2
(1.81)
σ2z [φ12(0)2 + φ12(1)2 + . . .+ φ12(h− 1)2]
σy(h)2
(1.82)
Basing on equation 1.80 and 1.81 we can conclude that: if the forecast error
variance of {yt} is not explained by {εzt}, it means that {yt} is exogenous and
so it is independent from the sequence {zt} and the {εyt} shocks, if instead the
forecast error variance of {yt} is fully explained by {εzt}, it means that {yt}
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is totally endogenous. Apart from these extreme cases, it is pretty common
to see that a variable can explain most of its forecast error variance at short
horizons. On the other hand, its explanation power decrease at longer horizon.
It is important to highlight that as already explained in section 1.1.6, to
recover the sequence {εyt} and{εzt}we need to restrict the B matrix. Different
types of restrictions involve different variance decompositions, which should
converge to the same values at longer forecasting horizons.
1.1.9 Generalized Impulse Response Function
The Generalized Impulse Response Function (GIRFs) is an alternative way to
analyze the consequences of a shock to the variables of interest. It is used
when it is difficult to find a plausible identification strategy, since GIRFs do
not require any constraint on the reduced form model. The main difference
between IRFs and GIRFs is the interpretation that we can give to the shocks:
in the first case we can assign to IRFs an economic meaning, while in the
second case the GIRFs offer only an identification from a statistical point of
view, without any economic content.
Let’s define a generic p dimensional VAR process as:
xt = κDt +
p∑
i=1
Γixt−i + εt (1.83)
where t = 1 , . . . ,T , Dt includes deterministic variables, εt is assumed to
be i.i.d with zero mean and positive definite covariance matrix Σε.
The corresponding forecast error is:
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where xt+h is the actual realization of x at horizon t + h, Et [xt+h|It ] is the
forecasted value of x at horizon t + h given It, which is an information set that





where j ≥ 1 the starting value φ0 is equal to Ip and the other values of φj
are derived from the matrix Γi .
As in Koop et al. (1996) we define the GIRFs as:
GIx(h, δ, It−1) =E [xt+h|δ, It−1]− E [xt+h|It−1] (1.86)
where δ = xt+h|εt. It means that:
GIx(h, δ, It−1) = φhδ (1.87)
The vector δ is the parameter which determines the path of GIRFs. For
purposes of presentation, we shock only one element of {εt}sequence. Thus,
defining εjt as δj , we can rewrite GIRFs as:
GIx(h, δj, It−1) = E [xt+h|εjt , It−1 ]− E [xt+h|It−1 ] (1.88)
assuming that the {εt} sequence is Gaussian and defining the standard
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In this way, we have found the response of xt+h to a standard deviation
shock to εjt .
1.2 Non-linear Vector Autoregressive Analy-
sis
Although linear VAR model may sometime approximate well the true data
generating process, economic theory suggests that in some situations can be
useful to use nonlinear models. For example, consider the case in which the
economy alternates between recession and expansion regimes. In such situati-
ons the parameters of our model might differ among states and the transitions
between regimes can be modelled with a a stochastic process. Moreover, it can
be the case that the parameters of our model evolve continuously over time,
following a particular law of motion. In cases like these, a standard linear VAR
Model is basically extremely inaccurate.
Consider the structural form of a standard VAR model:
B0xt = Γ0 + Γ1xt−1 + . . .+ Γpxt−p + εt (1.91)
which have the following reduced form:
xt = A0 + A1xt−1 + . . .+ At−p + et (1.92)
We can transform the reduced-form model to admit nonlinearities:
xt = Gt(xt−1, . . . , xt−p) + et (1.93)
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where Gt is a nonlinear function which depends on t, and the error term
are linear as in the standard VAR Model.
In the following sections we illustrate the following nonlinear VAR models:
Threshold VAR (TVAR), Smooth-Transition VAR (ST-VAR) and Interacted
VAR (IVAR).
1.2.1 Threshold VAR (TVAR) and Smooth-Transition
VAR (ST-VAR) Models
The TVAR and ST-VAR model were proposed by Balke and Fomby (1997)
and are particularly useful if we want to capture nonlinearities such as regime
switching generating asymmetry to shock responses. As a matter of fact, we
can identify different regimes using some threshold and describe each of them
using a linear model.
Consider the following reduced form VAR:
xt = A0 +
p∑
i=1








Where G (yt , θ) is a N × N function matrix, in which the variable yt and
the parameter θ determines the changes in the model coefficients. Thus, if
G (yt , θ) 6= 0 the model is nonlinear and the parameters A+0 and A+i influence
xt .
A TVAR model, may have the following form of G (yt , θ):
G (yt , θ) = I(yt > c)IK (1.95)
where yt is a scalar variable, I is an indicator function and c is a constant.
In this way, the parameters change when the threshold variable is higher than
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the value of c. Moreover, we can set multiple threshold by using different
values of c.
The main difference between TVAR and ST-VAR model is that the latter
allow for less abrupt changes between regimes. Consider for example, the case
in which G (yt , θ) is an exponential transition function such that:




−γ (yit − c1)2
]
· · · 0
... . . . ...
0 · · · 1− exp
[




where yt = (y1t , . . . , yNt)′ are transition variables, γ > 0 and θ = (γ, c1 ,. . . , cN)′.
Until a certain period TB, the transition variables yt are equal to cN and the
coefficients of our VAR are A0 , A1 , . . .Ap. After TB, they gradually deviate
from cN and the coefficients of our model become A0 , A+0 , A1 + A+1 , . . . , Ap +
A+p . In this setting the value of γ rules the celerity of the transition.
Once we set the model, we can estimate it by using nonlinear least-squares
(NLS) or maximum likelihood methods or Bayesian methods.
1.2.2 Interacted VAR Model
The Interacted VARmodel we illustrate in this section was built on the Interac-
ted Panel VAR developed by Sá et al. (2014) and Towbin and Weber (2013).We
choose to illustrate the model specified by Sá et al. (2014)10, considering a
specific case where we suppress panel dimension.
The main characteristic of this model, is the introduction of interaction
terms, which allow us to evaluate the reaction of variables of interest at
10In comparison with Towbin and Weber (2013), Sá et al. (2014) decided to construct
Bayesian error bands and choose to identify shocks through sign restrictions. We illustrate
in details the inference and identification procedures through section 3.2.3
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different values of the interaction term. Comparing this framework to regime-
switching approach like TVAR and ST-VAR, the IVAR does not require to
set a particular threshold. Moreover, the number of state can be potentially
equal to the number of observation. On the other hand, a threshold model uses
the information of each state under consideration separately and the setting
of the thresholds is subjected to discretion of researcher if not endogenously
modelled.




Γixt−i + κ1yt +
p∑
i=1
Γ1i ytxt−i + εt (1.97)
where t = 1, ..., T denotes time, i = 1, ..., p denotes the lags, κ is a constant,
Γi is a matrix of autoregressive coefficients , εt is vector of residuals which,
by assumption are normally distributed such that εt ∼ N (0, Σε) . The
interaction term, yt , has the capacity to influence both the level and the
dynamic relationship between endogenous variables through κ1 and Γ 1i .
The matrix Bt is a q×q lower triangular matrix with ones on the main dia-
gonal. Each component Bt(w, q) of Bt matrix represents the contemporaneous




Bt(w, q) = 0 for q > w
Bt(w, q) = 1 for q = w
Bt(w, q) = B(w, q) + B1(w, q)yt for q < w,
(1.98)
where the coefficients Bj and B1 represents the marginal effect of a change
in the variable and interaction term, respectively. Moreover, a recursive struc-
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ture11 has been imposed to matrix Bt which means that the covariance matrix
of the residuals Σε is diagonal.
1.2.2.1 Inference and identification
We start by estimating the recursive form presented in equation 3.1. Since
by construction the covariance matrix Σε is diagonal, we proceed by estima-
ting equation by equation using OLS. Furthermore, we set an uninformative
Wishart prior and draw from the posterior distribution the parameters of the
recursive form. Once coefficients are evaluated at the prespecified values of
interaction terms, by inverting the matrix Bt we obtain the reduced form
model:
xt = C +
p∑
i=1
Aixt−i + C1yt +
p∑
i=1
A1i ytxt−i + et (1.99)
Obviously, the vector of residuals will continue to be normally distributed
with mean zero and covariance matrix equal to Σet .
As we have already discussed, using an uninformative prior lead to the
same results of OLS estimation. Anyway, the authors choose a similar setting
with purpose to compute Bayesian error bands.
As a matter of fact, the Bayesian approach allows us to distinguish between
parameter uncertainty and identification uncertainty. The first is due to the
fact that we have a limited set of data, while the latter is a consequence of the
fact that we have limited information about the characteristics of the structural
shock. The use of Bayesian estimation is useful to account for parameter
uncertainty. On the other hand, to account for identification uncertainty,
for a given parameter draw d we find a number of rotation matrices that
11It implies that all the variables in the system react contemporaneously to the first
ordered variable, but the latter does not react on impact to any other variables.
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satisfy a particular set of sign restriction.12 Then, we save the median of the
IRFs generated by rotation matrices and move to the next parameter draw.
Furthermore, we avoid the possibility to have explosive IRFs by discarding the
explosive draws from the unrestricted posterior.
This Monte Carlo simulation, enables us to minimize these two types of
uncertainty. The final IRFs obtained will be the median of the median of the
IRFs saved during the simulation.13
Conclusions
The purpose of this survey has been to provide a brief overview of linear and
nonlinear Vector Autoregressive Models.
First, we showed how to correctly setup a linear VAR model and subse-
quently how to identify the structural form and recover useful causal informa-
tion through the impulse response functions and variance decomposition.
Second, we have illustrated some nonlinear VAR model, focusing on the
most widely used models from our point of view, like the TVAR, ST-VAR
and IVAR. This kind of models have become very popular in recent years, due
to their capacity to well represent more complex data generating processes.
As we have seen, however, we should use these models with caution. As
a matter of fact, in such situations, we have to deal with problems related
to over-parameterization, which may arise due to short data set. In this
context, Bayesian estimation can help us by shrinking coefficients on the base
of prior information. Through section 1.1.4 we have seen briefly how to conduct
estimation using Bayesian methods. However, reader interested in more details
12For further explanations about sign restriction identification approach, see section
1.1.6.3.
13The authors reports also the 16th and 84th percentile of the IRFs distribution which
reflects parameter uncertainty.
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about this topics are referred to Canova (2007), Lütkepohl (2005) and Koop
and Korobilis (2010).
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Abstract
We estimate state-dependent government spending multipliers for the United
States. We use an Interacted Vector Autoregression (IVAR) model to capture
the time-varying monetary policy characteristics including the recent zero
interest rate lower bound (ZLB) state. We identify government spending
shocks by sign restrictions and use a government spending growth forecast
series to account for the effects of anticipated fiscal policy. In our baseline
specification we find that government spending multipliers range from 3.4 to
3.7 at the ZLB. Away from the ZLB, multipliers range from 1.5 to 2.7. Next,
we address the limited information problem typically inherent in VARs by the
help of a Factor-Augmented IVAR (FAIVAR). We find that multipliers are
lower in this case, ranging from 2.0 to 2.1 at the ZLB and between 1.5 and 1.8
away from it. Thus, in both specifications we find that multipliers are higher,
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when the interest rate is lower. Our results are consistent with recent theories
that predict larger multipliers at the ZLB.
2.1 Introduction
How large is the government spending multiplier in normal times and how large
is it when monetary policy is constrained by the zero interest rate lower bound
(ZLB)? The Great Recession has revived the debate regarding this question
among policy circles and in academia as it is of high practical relevance. If
fiscal stimulus by means of an increase in government spending raises real
GDP by more than one-for-one, i.e., each dollar of the government spending
increase raises real GDP by more than one dollar, then such a stimulus is
highly desirable from a policymaking perspective.
The recent debate has given particular attention to the fact that since the
outbreak of the 2008 financial crisis the Fed’s monetary policy was accommo-
dative, or, even constrained by the ZLB. It is worthwhile that the accomodative
stance also included unconventional monetary policy.1 Figure 2.1 illustrates
monetary and fiscal policy from 1960Q1 to 2015Q4. The key observation
regarding the most recent recession is that the Federal Funds Rate was abruptly
cut to near zero and has remained there until 2015Q4. Moreover, there has
been a dramatic deficit-financed increase in government expenditures during
this period. It is frequently argued that in such an extraordinary situation, an
increase in government spending is even more effective than in normal times.
A growing theoretical literature examines this claim. There is an increasing
number of New Keynesian DSGE models that generates predictions consistent
with this claim. See, for instance, Christiano et al. (2011), Eggertsson (2010),
1For instance, the Fed announced three rounds of quantitative easing: in November 2008,
in November 2010, and in September 2012.
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Woodford (2011), Davig and Leeper (2011), or, Coenen et al. (2012). These
models predict a government spending multiplier in the range of 3 to 5. Li-
kewise, there is an emerging literature developing reasonable theories that
suggest that the government spending multiplier at the ZLB is one or below,
and lower than in times without the ZLB binding. See, for instance, Braun
et al. (2013), Mertens and Ravn (2014), Aruoba et al. (2017).
Given the wide range of theoretical predictions for the size of the govern-
ment spending multiplier at the ZLB, empirical evidence is a crucial need for
policymakers and academia.2
However, the empirical literature providing state-dependent evidence on
the size of the aggregate government spending multiplier at the ZLB is still
in its infancy. To date, Ramey and Zubairy (2017) is the single paper in
this literature according to our knowledge.3 Ramey and Zubairy (2017) use
the local projection method developed by Jordà (2005) and find that the
government spending multiplier at the ZLB can be as large as 1.5 in some
specifications. Moreover, there is a related, but distinct empirical literature
quantifying state-dependent fiscal multipliers in recessions based on regime-
switching VAR models. However, as Figure 2.1 illustrates, recessions and
episodes where the ZLB is binding do not necessarily coincide. Thus, there is
a need for more evidence on the government spending multiplier at the ZLB.
The objective of this paper is to provide further state-dependent evidence
on the size of the government spending multiplier at the ZLB from the United
States. We extend the literature by proposing an alternative framework to
quantify the state-dependent government spending multiplier. To this end we
2Christiano et al. (2011, p.81) argue: ‘The simple models discussed above suggest that the
multiplier can be large in the zero-bound state. The obvious next step would be to use reduced-
form methods, such as identified VARs, to estimate the government-spending multiplier when
the zero bound binds.’
3Crafts and Mills (2013) and Ramey (2011b) provide evidence for ZLB episodes
suggesting multipliers below unity.
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use an Interacted Vector Autoregression model (IVAR) building on the panel
IVAR in Towbin and Weber (2013) and Sá et al. (2014). The interaction term
allows us to derive impulse response functions (IRFs) to a government spending
shock at different percentiles of the interest rate distribution. This methodo-
logy enables us to investigate among the entire range of historical interest rates
for the sample considered: within the same setup, we are capable of computing
multipliers for median and low levels of the interest rate distribution, with no
need to restrict the sample.
By using the IVAR framework, we can address several potentially pro-
blematic issues of alternative frameworks that are used in the literature on
state-dependent multipliers. For instance, compared to regime-switching ap-
proaches in general, such as Threshold VAR (TVAR) methods, and, the Ramey
and Zubairy (2017) approach in particular, the IVAR model does not require
to define a particular threshold. Regime-switching approaches use such a
threshold to distinguish observations of normal times from ZLB episodes.
However, such a threshold is subject to discretion. In addition, the IVAR
uses all the information available for the full sample, while a threshold model
uses the information of each state under consideration separately. Moreover,
the IVAR does not rely on a particular assumption on an approximation of
monetary policy over the sample period, i.e., a Taylor (1993)-rule. For instance,
parts of the theoretical literature regard the contemporaneous-data Taylor-rule
applied in Ramey and Zubairy (2017) as a problematic approximation of
monetary policy, because it is not operational. For instance, real-time data is
hardly available even for central banks, see McCallum (1999) for a discussion.
Finally, an interest rate value implied by an ex post application of a Taylor
(1993)-rule below some threshold does not necessarily mean that the economy
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is at the ZLB. Ramey and Zubairy (2017, pp.23-24) are aware of this point
and then eliminate certain episodes on a discretionary basis.
An alternative may be to consider a Smooth Transition VAR (STVAR)
framework as used by Caggiano et al. (2015) to estimate the government
spending multiplier in recessions. However, there are also concerns regarding
an STVAR approach that do not apply to the IVAR model. First, the STVAR,
similar to a threshold model, allows only for a finite number of states in
practice. Second, as emphasized in Caggiano et al. (2017, p.11), the change
in monetary policy in times of crises is frequently abrupt and not smooth.
The STVAR framework is not designed to capture such abrupt changes. In
sum, compared to threshold-based approaches or the STVAR framework, the
IVAR offers clear advantages. The interaction term can capture abrupt policy
changes and allows for a large number of states. The number of states can
equal the number of available observations.
Another key strength of our empirical strategy is that we identify the
government spending shock by using sign restrictions and the series of govern-
ment spending growth forecasts errors used in Auerbach and Gorodnichenko
(2012, 2013). The sign restriction approach allows us to use a minimum of
economically meaningful and rather uncontroversial identification restrictions.4
The forecasts errors enable us to address the concerns related to fiscal foresight
in Leeper et al. (2013). The series captures the surprise component in a
broad measure of government spending and, as we show, is a relevant and
strong instrument for the our post WWII sample. An alternative would be to
consider the defense news series used in Ramey and Zubairy (2017). However,
this is a rather narrow measure that captures just a particular component of
government spending. Furthermore, as Ramey (2011b) reports, defense news
4The sing restrictions approach is developed in Canova and De Nicolò (2002), Uhlig
(2005). Mountford and Uhlig (2009) apply it to fiscal policy.
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appears to be a rather weak instrument, when a post WWII sample does not
cover the period of the Korean War.
For our sample from 1966Q4 to 2015Q4, we consider two different specifica-
tions. Our baseline specification involves the forecast error series, government
spending, GDP and the average tax rate. At the ZLB, government spending
multipliers are between 3.42 and 3.66. When monetary policy is not constrai-
ned by the ZLB, government spending multipliers are between 1.54 and 2.56.
Our second specification addresses the generic limited information problem
inherent in VARs as a robustness check. On the one side, introducing more
and more variables to the VAR adds more information. However, adding
additional variables to the VAR implies a loss of degree of freedom. We
handle this trade-off by considering a Factor-Augmented IVAR (FAIVAR).
Compared to the baseline specification, we obtain lower multipliers in the
FAIVAR. Nevertheless, the bottom line result is the same: multipliers are
higher when interest rates are lower. At the ZLB multipliers range from 1.98
to 2.10 while multipliers range from 1.48 to 1.79 away from the ZLB. Thus,
our results are qualitatively and quantitatively consistent with the claim that
increases in government spending are even more effective at the ZLB.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2.2 outlines the IVAR model,
our baseline specification and data, our inference and identification approach
and how we calculate the multipliers; Section 2.3 discusses the main results;
Sections 2.4 addresses misspecification concerns; Section 2.5 concludes.
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2.2 Methodology
2.2.1 Empirical Model
We use an Interacted VAR Model based on Towbin and Weber (2013) and Sá




ΓkYt−k + κ1Xt +
L∑
k=1
Γ1kXtYt−k + εt, (2.1)
where t = 1, . . . , T denotes time and k = 1, . . . , L denotes the lag length.
Yt is a q × 1 vector which contains explanatory variables, κ is the constant
term, ΓK is a q × q matrix of autoregressive coefficients, εt ∼ N(0,Σ) is the
vector of residuals.
Moreover, Xt denotes the interaction term, which can influence both the
dynamic relationship between endogenous variables and their level, trough Γ1k
and κ1 respectively.
The matrix Bt is a q × q lower triangular matrix with ones on the main
diagonal. Each component Bt(w, q) represents the contemporaneous effect of




Bt(w, q) = 0 for q > w
Bt(w, q) = 1 for q = w
Bt(w, q) = B(w, q) + B1(w, q)Xt for q < w,
(2.2)
5The exposition follows Sá et al. (2014) although we do not consider a panel of countries.
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where B(w, q) and B1(w, q) are regression coefficients capturing the margi-
nal effects of a change in the interaction term. The recursive structure imposes
that all the variables in the system react contemporaneously to the first ordered
variable, but the latter does not react on impact to any other variables. The
recursive form of the matrix Bt also implies that the covariance matrix of the
residuals, Σ, is diagonal.
2.2.2 Baseline Specification
Our data set consists of U.S. quarterly data and goes from 1966Q4 to 2015Q4.6
In our baseline specification our vector (2.1) of endogenous variables is:
Yt = [FEt,Gt,GDPt,Tt]′. (2.3)
This vector Yt includes variables that are commonly used in the literature
(e.g., Blanchard and Perotti, 2002). Gt represents real government spending
and we use government consumption expenditures and gross investment as a
proxy. Tt denotes the average tax revenue. We use federal government current
receipts as a proxy for this variable. Moreover, GDPt stands for real gross
domestic product.
Finally, FEt denotes a series of forecast errors of the annualized growth rate
of real government spending following Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012).7
By this series we address fiscal foresight. In Appendix 2.B we provide evidence
that FEt has high explanatory power regarding the variation in growth of Gt
6The choice of this time period is motivated by the availability of the Greenbook and
SPF government spending forecasts.
7Appendix 2.A contains further information on the computation of this variable.
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and is therefore a relevant instrument to control for fiscal foresight that cannot
be considered weak.8
Variables Gt and GDPt, are expressed in real terms and considered in levels.
Tt is in nominal terms and divided by nominal GDP. With the exception
of the average tax rate, the other variables and FEt have been normalized
with an estimate of real potential GDP. Ramey and Zubairy (2017) show that
the usual approach of using log of variables requires an ex post conversion to
dollar equivalents of the estimated elasticities that can produce serious bias.
The problem is even more acute in nonlinear models and in particular in our
model, where several multipliers can be potentially computed, since the ex post
conversion requires a factor which is based on the sample average of the ratio of
GDP to government spending. With the kind of normalization just described,
government spending multipliers can be computed directly9. Further details
about all variables that we use, transformation and so on, are provided in
Table 2.2.
For the interaction term we use the U.S. Shadow Federal Funds Rate
developed by Wu and Xia (2016), i.e., Xt = srt−1. The interaction term
allows us to examine how the time-varying interest rate environment affects
the transmission mechanism of the government spending shock among the
variables in Yt. However, when we set a specific value of the interaction term,
our empirical model implies that the shadow rate remains the same for the
20 quarters, corresponding to the horizon over which we calculate impulse
responses. For this reason we investigate the effects of a government spending
shock at different percentiles of the shadow rate, specifically at 1st, 5th, 13th,
25th, 50th and 75th percentile of its distribution. We consider the range from
8For further explanations about the fiscal foresight critique see Leeper et al. (2013).
9Further details about the computation of the government spending multipliers are
described below. For more details on the bias caused by the ex post conversion of the
elasticities see Ramey and Zubairy (2017)
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the 1st to the 13th percentile of the Shadow Rate distribution as the low
interest state, as the 13th percentile coincides with a value of the interest rate
equal to 0.25. The latter value is conventionally accepted by the literature
as the lower bound for monetary policy in using the Federal Funds rate as
instrument. Results for the 25th percentile and above are associated with the
high interest state. It is important to emphasize that we use this categorization
of percentiles in order to structure the discussion of results later on. However,
this is not a threshold that affects our results.
We use the U.S. Shadow Federal Funds Rate as this rate is a more precise
indicator of monetary policy after the Federal Funds Rate reached the ZLB:
away from the ZLB this series is equal to the effective federal funds rate,
but at ZLB Wu and Xia (2016) use a Gaussian Affine Term Structure Model
(GATSM) to generate an effective rate. Figure 2.1 illustrates this point. After
the abrupt cut in the Federal Funds Rate during the most recent recession, the
Federal Funds Rate has been near zero and shows little variation. However,
unconventional monetary policy measures have been implemented and the
variation in the Shadow Federal Funds Rate in the same period captures this
policy. We use first lag of the shadow rate to address potential endogeneity
concerns. Specifying Xt = srt−1 implies that the monetary policy instrument
is not endogenous to Yt. If we were to specify Xt = srt reverse causality could
be a problem.10
Finally, notice that we choose a lag length of L = 1 in order to preserve
the parsimony of the model.11
10Notice that specifying Xt = srt does not have a significant effect on our results and
conclusions below.
11The lag length has been chosen on the base of the Hannan-Quinn(HQ) and Schwarz-
Bayes(SBC) information criteria.
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2.2.3 Inference and Identification
As in Uhlig (2005) and Sá et al. (2014) we use Bayesian estimation by setting
an uninformative normal-Wishart prior, and start with the estimation of the
recursive model described in equation (2.1). Since we know that the covariance
matrix Σ is diagonal by construction we can proceed by estimating the model
equation by equation. For each equation we draw the recursive-form parame-
ters jointly from the posterior.12 We evaluate them at a pre-specified value of
the interaction term and compute reduced form parameters by inverting the
matrix Bt:
Yt = B−1t κ+B−1t
L∑
k=1
ΓkYt−k +B−1t κ1Xt +B−1t
L∑
k=1
Γ1kXtYt−k +B−1t εt, or,
(2.4)
Yt = C +
L∑
k=1
AkYt−k + C1Xt +
L∑
k=1
A1kXtYt−k + et, (2.5)
where the vector of residuals et ∼ N(0,Σet ) and the Cholesky decomposition
of the reduced form covariance matrix is given by Vt = B−1t Σ
1
2 .
Government spending shocks are identified by imposing sign-restrictions.13
Once we have obtained the Cholesky decomposition of the reduced form covari-
ance Vt, the general idea is to obtain combinations of Vt by using an orthogonal
matrix Q such that V ∗t = QVt, where orthogonality of the shocks is preserved.
Rubio-Ramírez et al. (2010) propose to draw a W matrix from a N(0,1) and
use the QR decomposition (householder transformation), obtaining W = QR,
12As in Sá et al. (2014); Cogley and Sargent (2005); Primiceri (2005) we avoid the
possibility to have explosive IRFs by discarding the explosive draws from the unrestricted
posterior.
13This approach was developed by Canova and De Nicolò (2002), Faust and Rogers (2003),
Uhlig (2005). As in Sá et al. (2014) we use the algorithm developed by Rubio-Ramírez et al.
(2010).
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where Q is the orthogonal matrix required to impose the sign restrictions
that allows to preserve orthogonality of the shocks derived from the Cholesky
decomposition, since QVtQ′ = I. In this way, candidate draws for the impulse
vector are obtained and the impulse responses are calculated, discarding any
V ∗t where the sign restrictions are violated in all its columns. Repeating such
operations until a desired number of draws meet the required sign restrictions
allow to calculate the median responses over the accepted draws.
The set of sign restrictions imposed to obtain identification of a government
spending shock are as follow: GDP and government spending responses are
constrained to be positive for at least four quarters, while the forecast error
for only one quarter (see also Table 2.1). No restrictions are imposed on the
average tax variable.14
Our procedure accounts for identification uncertainty: for each stable pa-
rameter draw of the posterior we find a set of 100 orthonormal matrices that
satisfies the sign restrictions. We then compute the corresponding IRFs saving
only the median of the 100 identified models.15 We then repeat this step for
each stable draw of the posterior described above for 20.000 parameter draws
considering the median of the medians as our estimate of interest.16
2.2.4 Multipliers
We estimate the model in normalized levels, similar to Ramey and Zubairy
(2017). Thus, there is no need to normalize IRFs in any way, or, to carry
14 Identification based on sign restrictions is in principle less sensitive to the estimation
of the covariance matrix than identification based on short-run restrictions. However we
start with estimation of the structural model, where the order might influence results. This
is why we have estimated the model with alternative orderings and do not find significant
changes.
15Uncertainty about identification is due to the fact that we have limited information
about the true structural shock. For further details see Sá et al. (2014) and Cogley and
Sargent (2005).
16We compute 20.000 stable draws, discarding the first 10.000 as burn-in draws.
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out the ex-post conversion that is typically applied in the existing literature
(see, e.g., Ramey, 2011b). Our IRFs represent the change in the variable of
interest to a surprise change in government spending. For instance, for GDP
this means dGDP(t)/dFE(t).
We compute three types of multipliers denoted by Mi ∈ {1, 2, 3}. M1 is
based on Ramey (2011b), who makes a discrete approximation of the integral






Multipliers 2 and 3 are computed using numerical integration, through the
use of the Trapezoidal and Simpson’s rule, respectively. The goal of these two






Following Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012), we choose H = 20.
2.3 Main Results
In this section we present the macroeconomic effects of a one unit government
spending forecast shock obtained for our baseline specification. Figures 2.2
and 2.3 show the IRFs of endogenous variables for the low and high interest
rate state respectively.
First, observe that IRFs for government spending and GDP in both states
are persistently different from zero, except for very high interest rates. More-
over, the median IRF of the average tax rate is mostly insignificant in the low
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interest rate state. Thus, we have identified a predominantly deficit-financed
spending increase in both states.
The behavior of government spending is similar among states. Government
spending peaks on impact and is persistently different from zero throughout
the time horizon.
Thus, what are the effects on GDP? In sum, the IRFs for GDP qualitatively
resemble the behavior of government spending in their respective state. GDP
peaks on impact and has a persistently positive response in the subsequent
quarters. However, in the high interest rate state, the median IRF becomes
insignificant at an earlier point in time. Taking the behavior of GDP and
government spending together, the IRFs suggest that when the interest rate is
at the ZLB, a comparable exogenous increase in government spending is more
effective in stimulating GDP.
The implied multipliers are consistent with our observations, see Table 2.4.
Multipliers, depending on the definition, are in the range of 3.42 and 3.66 in
the low interest rate state and around 1.54 and 2.56 in the high interest rate
state. Thus, the multipliers also suggest that government spending increases
are more effective in the low interest rate state. Moreover, notice that the
multipliers for both states are large compared to the VAR literature in general
(see, e.g., Ramey, 2011a) and compared to the findings of Ramey and Zubairy
(2017) who report multipliers of at most 1.5 at the ZLB and multipliers below
unity away from the ZLB.
In sum, our findings cannot be reconciled with theories that suggest that
the government spending multiplier at the ZLB is 1 or below, and lower than
in the high interest rate state (see, e.g., Braun et al., 2013; Mertens and Ravn,
2014; Aruoba et al., 2017). In addition, our findings, especially for the high
interest rate state, contradict with standard Real Business Cycle models (see,
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e.g., Baxter and King, 1993) that predict a negative wealth effect and lower
multipliers due to crowding out of consumption.17
In contrast, our results can be reconciled with New Keynesian DSGE
models that predict government spending multipliers at the ZLB in the range
of 3 to 5 (see, e.g. Christiano et al., 2011; Eggertsson, 2010; Woodford, 2011;
Davig and Leeper, 2011; Coenen et al., 2012). For instance, in models such as
Christiano et al. (2011) the negative wealth effect of a government spending
stimulus is weakened by assumption. As a consequence, co-movement in
consumption and real wages due to counter-cyclical markups is possible.18
An increase in government spending raises aggregate output, marginal cost,
and expected inflation. At the ZLB, the key channel to explain the higher
multipliers is related to the real interest rate. As expected inflation increases
and the nominal interest rate is zero, the real interest rate must fall. In
consequence, private consumption increases, raises aggregate output, marginal
cost and expected inflation once more. Thus, the ZLB amplifies the effects of
government spending on output. As the output increases require an increase
in employment, these models also imply real wage increases.
2.4 Robustness
In this section we address misspecification concerns regarding our baseline
specification and the results presented above. Notice that we maintain the
identification approach described in Section 2.2.3 throughout the robustness
analysis.
17An increase in government spending lowers the present value of after-tax income. As a
consequence, agents lower consumption and increase labor supply. The latter decreases the
real wage and higher employment can raise investment.
18Thus, in such models multipliers can be large even without considering the ZLB (see,
Galí et al., 2007).
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2.4.1 Factor-Augmented Interacted VAR Model
In particular, one may argue that our baseline specification is problematic for
two reasons that can be addressed by developing a FAIVAR model. First, the
choice of variables in Yt is subject to discretion. Thus, one may argue that our
results are due to the particular choice of variables in Yt.
Second, given the considerations and results in Fragetta and Gasteiger
(2014), one may argue that our Interacted VAR model is affected by a generic
limited information problem. As a matter of fact, when economic agents make
their decisions, they use all available information at the time. In contrast, an
econometrician can only take into account a limited set of information, due to
the problem related to degrees of freedom.
A FAIVAR model addresses both lines of critique. On the one hand it
allows us to take into account the information from a large informational
data set and to maintain a small set of variables in Yt that is necessary for
meaningful identification. Thus, discretion in the specification of Yt is limited
to a minimum. On the other hand, the FAIVAR model allows us to overcome
the generic limited information problem.
We implement a two-step estimation procedure. Following Bernanke et al.
(2005), we use the method of principal components to extract and summarize
information from a large dataset.19 The Bai and Ng (2002, 2007) ICp2 cri-
terion suggests to extract four static factors. Thus, we specify the vector of
endogenous variables in the FAIVAR model as
19We apply the principal components method by using the same informational dataset as
used in Fragetta and Gasteiger (2014). Their informational dataset comprises 61 publicly
available time series from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis’ FRED® Economic
Database. As in their case we transform variables to guarantee stationarity according to
Dickey and Fuller (1979) and Kwiatkowski et al. (1992) tests.
61
2.The Government Spending Multiplier at the ZLB: Evidence from the U.S.
Yt = [FEt,Gt,GDPt,Tt,Ft]′. (2.8)
where Ft is the 4 × 1 vector capturing the first four principal components of
the informational dataset.
The IRFs in Figures 2.4 and 2.5 depict the low and high interest rate state
respectively. Overall, IRFs of government spending and average taxes show a
qualitatively similar pattern as in the baseline specification.
However, IRFs for GDP reveal several differences compared to the baseline
specification. First, IRFs for GDP are less persistent. This behavior is parti-
cular evident in the low interest rate state. In the latter case, one ca also find
hump-shaped IRFs. Nevertheless, the lower persistence should be reflected in
lower multipliers.
Consistent with this claim, Table 2.4 shows that multipliers are now lower
in both states. Moreover, decline of multipliers in the FAIVAR compared to
the IVAR is of higher magnitude in the low interest rate state. Neverthe-
less, multipliers in the low interest rate state range from 1.98 to 2.10, while
multipliers range from 1.48 to 1.79 in the high interest rate state. Thus, as
multipliers in the low interest rate state exceed the ones in the high interest
rate state, we conclude that our baseline results are robust with regard to
the particular specification of Yt and the generic generic limited information
problem of (interacted) VARs.
2.5 Conclusions
This paper sheds light on the question of whether the government spending
multiplier at the ZLB is larger than in normal times. To this end, we implement
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an Interacted VAR model and use sign restrictions to identify government
spending growth forecast shocks. This framework allows us to account for fiscal
foresight and to estimate state-dependent government spending multipliers at
all percentiles of the nominal interest rate distribution.
In contrast to the existing state-dependent estimates, we find convincing
evidence that government spending multipliers are larger in low interest rate
states than in high interest rate states. For our sample from 1966 to 2015,
the multipliers at the ZLB are in the range of 3.4 to 3.7. The ones away from
the ZLB are between 1.5 to 2.7. Our findings are robust to several important
misspecification concerns.
Thus, we conclude that the government spending multiplier at the ZLB is
larger than in normal times and within the range of 3 to 5 as predicted by
recent New Keynesian DSGE models.
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General Information. Table 2.2 contains an overview on the data that
we use. If appropriate, nominal variables are transformed into real variables
by dividing by the GDP implicit price deflator. Moreover, real variables in
levels, if appropriate, are normalized by dividing by real potential GDP. The
forecast error that we use is the forecast error for the annualized growth rate
of real government spending. We normalize this variable by subtracting the
annualized growth rate of real potential GDP.
Forecast Error. Our measure of the forecast error, FEt builds on the








The data source is the Mean Responses of Real Federal Government Con-
sumption Expenditures & Gross Investment (RFEDGOV) and Real State
and Local Government Consumption Expenditures & Gross Investment (RSL-
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GOV). Get|t−1 is the sum of RFEDGOV3 and RSLGOV3, Get−1|t−1 is the sum
of RFEDGOV2 and RSLGOV2.
As our objective is to compute a series of surprise increases in government
spending, we need to control for real-time data. The forecast error for the







Thus, for this purpose, we have downloaded first release data on real
government consumption expenditures and gross investment: state and local
(RGSL) from this websiteand real government consumption and gross invest-
ment: federal (RGF) from this website. All in quarterly vintages (Billions of
real dollars, seasonally adjusted). G1stt is the sum of RGSL and RGF.
Notice that the SPF data is only available from 1981Q4. Thus, for earlier
periods, as in Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012), we take advantage of the
fact that SPF is also quite similar to Greenbook forecasts prepared for FOMC
meetings. Thus, we splice data from SPF and Greenbook forecasts and obtain
a series which goes from 1966Q4 to 2015Q4.
2.B Explanatory Power of the Forecast Error
Following Ramey (2011b, pp.25-29) we examine the explanatory power of FEt.
In particular, we run regressions such as
∆Gt = β0FEt +
L∑
k=1
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Such a regression can shed light on the question of whether FEt (or lags
of it) can explain part of the variation of the growth in Gt. A high F-statistic
is an indicator that this is the case and that FEt can be considered a relevant
instrument to control for fiscal foresight. The results in the second column
of Table 2.3 suggest that FEt is a relevant instrument and that it cannot be
considered a weak instrument as the F-statistics are way above the rule-of-
thumb critical value of 10.
Notice that even with two lags, L = 1, FEt has considerable predictive
power. This is surprising as, by construction, one would expect that it has only
predictive power for L = 0. The reason for the latter is that FEt represents
a measure for the unpredictable component of ∆Gt. Therefore our results for
L > 0 imply that the unpredictable components in ∆Gt have some persistence.
The third column in Table 2.3 reports the marginal F-statistic for a regres-
sion of the growth rate of Gt on the explanatory variables used in the baseline










βk,TTt−k + εt. (2.12)
Table 2.3 reports low marginal F-statistics and values for R-squared, which
suggests that FEt is a relevant instrument.
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Figures
Figure 2.1: Monetary and fiscal policy, 1960Q1 to 2015Q4. The shaded areas
indicate recessions according to NBER.
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Figure 2.2: IRFs to a one unit government spending growth forecast shock for
the baseline specification with Xt = srt−1 in the low interest rate state. The
blue solid lines represent the median of the median distribution of IRFs for
each parameter draw, and the red dotted lines report the 16th and 84th of the
set of accepted impulse-response functions for all parameter draws.
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Figure 2.3: IRFs to a one unit government spending growth forecast shock for
the baseline specification with Xt = srt−1 in the high interest rate state. The
blue solid lines represent the median of the median distribution of IRFs for
each parameter draw, and the red dotted lines report the 16th and 84th of the
set of accepted impulse-response functions for all parameter draws.
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Figure 2.4: IRFs to a one unit government spending growth forecast shock for
the specification with Xt = srt−1 and Ft in the low interest rate state. The
blue solid lines represent the median of the median distribution of IRFs for
each parameter draw, and the red dotted lines report the 16th and 84th of the
set of accepted impulse-response functions for all parameter draws.
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Figure 2.5: IRFs to a one unit government spending growth forecast shock for
the specification with Xt = srt−1 and Ft in the high interest rate state. The
blue solid lines represent the median of the median distribution of IRFs for
each parameter draw, and the red dotted lines report the 16th and 84th of the
set of accepted impulse-response functions for all parameter draws.
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Tables
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Table 2.3: Explanatory Power of FEt.a







aFor each lag length L the first line reports results for regression (2.11). The
second line reports results for regression (2.12). In the case of L = 0, (2.12)
uses contemporaneous values.
Table 2.4: Multipliers identified with FEt.a
Baseline: Xt = srt−1
1st 5th 13th 25th 50th 75th
M1 3.66 3.34 3.42 2.56 2.10 1.70
M2 3.64 3.32 3.40 2.53 2.07 1.64
M3 3.64 3.32 3.40 2.53 2.07 1.64
Robustness: Xt = srt−1 and Ft
1st 5th 13th 25th 50th 75th
M1 2.00 2.10 2.06 1.79 1.62 1.51
M2 1.98 2.08 2.05 1.76 1.60 1.48
M3 1.98 2.08 2.04 1.76 1.60 1.48
aMultipliersMi ∈ {1, 2, 3} are calculated as outlined in Section 2.2.4.
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Abstract
We use an Interacted Panel Vector Autoregressive (IPVAR) model, to inves-
tigate the effects of a government spending shock when the interest rate is
at zero lower bound (ZLB). We also compare the responses of variables of
interest at the ZLB with what we get when a government spending shock
occurs in normal times (i.e. when the interest rate is larger than 0.25).
We identify the government spending shock by sign restrictions and use the
European Commission forecasts of government expenditure to account for
fiscal foresight. For the baseline specification we find lower multipliers in
times in which the ZLB is binding. However, fiscal foresight is not the only
problem in fiscal VARs related to limited information problems. Usually,
VAR models can only consider a limited number of variables due to degree of
freedom problems. Several authors have shown (see Stock and Watson (2005)
for a survey) how principal components extracted from a larger number of
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variables, can approximate unobserved factors driving most (if not all) of the
macroeconomic variables. Therefore, we develop a Factor-Augmented IPVAR
model (FAIPVAR) and find that the multipliers are very similar among states,
ranging between 1.08 and 1.41 at the ZLB and between 1.26 and 1.39 away
from it. We also divide our sample, considering two groups of countries in
terms of high and low debt-to-GDP ratios. We find that countries with high
levels of debt-to-GDP ratio show relatively lower multipliers. Considering the
FAIPVAR model, the government spending multiplier ranges between 2.69
and 3.54 for core countries and between 0.82 and 1.37 for peripheral countries.
Therefore, our findings support some recent studies, which suggest that the
government spending multiplier is even larger if the debt-to-GDP ratio is low.
3.1 Introduction
The recent world financial crisis and the Great Recession that has followed
have renewed interest for the use of discretionary fiscal policies. Starting from
2009, many OECD and developing countries have implemented expansionary
fiscal policies with the purpose to soften the effects of the Great Recession.
In Europe, the European Commission launched the “European Economic Re-
covery Plan” (EERP) with the aim to provide coordinated fiscal stimulus to
the euro area economies. A natural question arises: has this expansionary
fiscal policy succeeded to help Eurozone economies? More specifically, what is
the magnitude of the government spending multiplier when monetary policy
is constrained at the Zero Lower Bound(ZLB)?1 Is it larger or smaller than in
normal times? There is much uncertainty about these questions: on the one
1However, many Euro countries have started to implement austerity measures since 2010.
We assume symmetry of responses to a positive or negative fiscal shock. Therefore our
estimates are potentially informative about the loss in terms of output implied by austerity
measures adopted.
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hand, there are researchers who support fiscal stimulus and consequently high-
light the Keynesian multiplier effects of a rise in government spending which is
even stronger at the ZLB; on the other hand, there are other researchers who
criticize fiscal stimulus, arguing that a rise in government spending leads to a
very low or even negative fiscal multiplier due to the crowding-out of private
consumption and investments.
We join the debate by estimating the government spending multiplier for
a set of countries which belong to the Euro Area, in the period that goes
from 2000q2 to 2015q4. To this end, we use the Interacted Panel VAR Mo-
del (IPVAR) developed by Sá et al. (2014) and Towbin and Weber (2013).2
Furthermore, in order to account for fiscal foresight, we use the forecasts of
government spending made available by the European Commission. The fiscal
foresight is due to the fact that most of the fiscal policies are pre-announced
and so the economic agents take into account their consequences before they
would be actually put in place. More precisely, we add this variable to our
specifications with the purpose to purge them from the innovations in the
exogenous government spending which are anticipated by agents. Using a sign
restrictions approach we identify two shocks: the first identifies the forecast
of government spending made at time t − 1; the second, which is our shock
of interest, will be orthogonal to the first and therefore it does not contain
expectations made at time t− 1.
In this baseline specification we find that the government spending multi-
plier ranges between 0.33 and 0.88 at the ZLB, while away from it, a higher
multiplier is found ranging between 1.10 and 1.29. However, although we
use a fiscal VAR shared by a large part of the literature (see Blanchard and
2For further details about the features of the IPVAR model see Sá et al. (2014). Di Serio
et al. (2017) also compare the Interacted VAR model with other nonlinear model used in
this kind of literature.
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Perotti (2002) for their baseline specification, for example) results might be
driven by misspecification concerns in terms of important information that
we do not include in our model, but that might be potentially considered by
economic agents in determining their choices. Several authors have shown (see
Stock and Watson (2005) for a survey) how principal components extracted
from a large number of variables, can approximate unobserved factors driving
most (if not all) of the macroeconomic variables. We therefore consider a
Factor-Augmented IPVAR specification to address such concerns. The results
show generally similar multipliers among states. The government spending
multiplier ranges between 1.08 and 1.41 in the low interest rate state, and
between 1.26 and 1.39 in the high interest rate state. These results show no
significant difference between multipliers found in the low and high interest
rate states. Overall, we find multipliers that are larger than one, in line with
New-Keynesian theoretical predictions.
Then, we proceed our analysis by investigating whether the debt-to-GDP
ratio can influence the size of the government spending multiplier. To this
end, we consider two different sets of countries. The first is constituted by
countries that have had high levels of public debt (higher than 90%) during
the 2009-2015 (Belgium, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain).3 The second one
includes countries that during the same period have a debt-to-GDP ratio lower
than 90% (Austria, Finland, France, Germany and Netherlands). We find that
the government spending multiplier is generally higher for countries which
have a lower debt-to-GDP ratio. Considering the specification augmented
with factors, the government spending multiplier for countries with low debt-
to-GDP ratio ranges between 3.11 and 3.54, while it ranges between 0.82 and
3To be more precise, for Spain the public debt is lower and around 85%. However, it has
been one of the countries most hit by the sovereign debt crisis. From a low public debt level
before the crisis, the latter has caused a rapid deterioration of its public finances.
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1.18 for peripheral countries, at the ZLB. The main purpose of this additional
exercise is to show qualitative differences between the government spending
multipliers at different level of the debt-to-GDP ratio, since they are all subject
to the same monetary policy. From our point of view, the findings we get from
the full sample specifications are more accurate because they consider countries
that all together represent 95.6% of the EA-19 Total GDP.
Our paper is related to a growing theoretical literature which analyzes
the size of the government spending multipliers when the interest rate is
at the ZLB. Among the others, Christiano et al. (2011), Eggertsson (2010),
Woodford (2011), Davig and Leeper (2011) and Coenen et al. (2012) develop
New Keynesian DSGE Models which predict higher multipliers at ZLB.4 On
the other hand, Braun et al. (2013), Mertens and Ravn (2014) and Aruoba
et al. (2017) argue that the government spending multiplier at ZLB is very
small and also lower than in normal times.
Despite the uncertainty about the sign and magnitude of the government
spending multiplier, very few studies concerning the effects of government
spending at the ZLB have been devoted to the Euro Area. Kilponen et al.
(2015) compute the fiscal multiplier using a set of structural macroeconomic
models adopted by the European System of Central Banks (ESBC). They find
that if temporary fiscal shock happens simultaneously in the Euro Area (as
in our empirical strategy), the government spending multiplier has a stronger
impact at the ZLB than in normal times. On the other hand, if this shock hits
only the economy of one country the relative government spending multiplier
is very low and similar to the multiplier computed in normal times. Coenen
et al. (2012) evaluate the effectiveness of the implemented fiscal policies during
the Great Recession. Specifically, they use the European Central Bank’s New
4According to their studies, the government spending multiplier at ZLB is in the range
of 3 to 5.
86
3.The Government Spending Multiplier at the ZLB: Evidence from the E.A.
Area-Wide Model (NAWM) and find that discretionary exogenous policies of
1% lead to an increase of 1.6% of real GDP. On the opposite side, Cwik and
Wieland (2011) find no higher effects of the government spending shock, unless
the ZLB state was anticipated and holds for at least two years. Among the
models used, the only European Central Bank’s Area-Wide Model provides
evidences in favor of a government spending multiplier which is higher at the
ZLB.
With regard to the literature analyzing the relationship between fiscal
multipliers and different level of debt-to-GDP ratio, Sutherland (1997), for
example, shows how government spending shocks have expansionary effects
when the debt-to-GDP ratio is low, becoming contractionary at high level of
debt-to-GDP ratio. Perotti (1999) develops a model which analyzes the effects
of both tax and expenditure shocks, finding that the reaction of consumers
to a government spending shock can be very different, depending on the
initial level of public debt-to-GDP ratio. At a high level of debt-to-GDP
ratio, expectations of future increase in taxation generate higher negative
wealth effects on fiscal multipliers. On the empirical side, Ilzetzki et al.
(2013) follow the Blanchard and Perotti (2002) methodology, estimating a
VAR which includes 44 countries from 1960q1 to 2007q4. They find that the
size and the sign of government spending multiplier depend on country-specific
characteristics. In particular, they find that if debt-to-GDP ratio exceeds
60% of GDP, the fiscal multiplier is not statistically different from zero on
impact and negative in the long run (i.e the fiscal multipliers is negative).
Kirchner et al. (2010) analyze the effects of government spending shock and
the transmission mechanism within the euro area from 1980 to 2008. They
find that an increase in debt-to-GDP ratio causes the short run effect to be
negative. Nickel and Tudyka (2014) develop an Interacted Panel VAR for
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17 European countries from 1970 to 2010, analyzing fiscal multipliers which
depend in their model nonlinearly from the debt-to-GDP ratio. Their findings
are in line with previous works: the effects of a government spending shock
are positive when debt-to-GDP ratio is low, while become negative when this
ratio is high.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 3.2 describes the methodology
we use, data and how we calculate the multipliers; Section 3.3 discusses the
results of our baseline specification; Sections 3.4 describes result for baseline
specification augmented with factors; Section 3.5 shows results for high and
low levels of debt-to-GDP ratio; Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Methodology
3.2.1 Empirical Model
Our model is built on the Interacted Panel VAR model developed by Sá et al.
(2014) and Towbin and Weber (2013).The introduction of interaction terms,
allow us to evaluate non-linearities and the reaction of variables of interest at
different values of the interest rate.












Γ 1kxi,tyi,t−k +εi,t (3.1)
where t = 1, ..., T denotes time, i = 1, ..., N denotes the country, k =
1, ..., L denotes the lags, κj is country-specific intercepts, Γj,k is a matrix of
autoregressive coefficients , Dj,i is an indicator for each country5, εi,t is the
5It is equal to 1 if i = j, and 0 otherwise.
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vector of residuals which, by assumption, are uncorrelated across countries
and normally distributed such that εi,t ∼ N (0, Σε) . The interaction term,
xi,t , has the capacity to influence both the level and the dynamic relationship
between endogenous variables through κ1 and Γ 1k .
The matrix Bi,t is a q × q lower triangular matrix with ones on the main
diagonal. Each component Bi,t(w, q) of Bi,t matrix represents the contempo-




Bi,t(w, q) = 0 for q > w
Bi,t(w, q) = 1 for q = w
Bi,t(w, q) = Bj(w, q)Dj,i +B1(w, q)xi,t for q < w
(3.2)
where the coefficients Bj and B1 represent the marginal effect of a change in
the variable and interaction term, respectively. Moreover, a recursive structure
has been imposed to matrix Bi,t which means that the covariance matrix of
the residuals Σε is diagonal.
Imposing the shadow rate (i.e.sr) as an interaction term, the coefficient
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By using this setting, our results will be averaged across countries6 and we
can compute IRFs for a specific value of interaction term.
3.2.2 Baseline Specification
Our dataset consists of quarterly data for 10 countries that have adopted the
Euro from 1999Q1, for which the sample analyzed ranges between 2000Q2 and
2015Q4.7 Appendix A provides further details about the composition of our
dataset and the filter used.
Concerning our baseline specification, we choose variables which are com-
monly used in this literature:
yi,t = [EUFi,t, Gi,t, GDPi,t, Ti,t]′ (3.5)
where Gi,t, GDPi,t and Ti,t represent real government spending, real gross
domestic product and average tax revenue, respectively. All the variables are
in real term and considered in levels, the average tax revenue is computed by
dividing the Total Nominal General Government Revenue series by the no-
minal GDP. The EUFi,t series represents the forecast of government spending
published by the European Commission every six months. In this way, we have
the opportunity to purge our VAR from the change in government spending
which is anticipated by agents (i.e. fiscal foresight).8
6We follow the same methodology used by Sá et al. (2014). As explained by Canova and
Ciccarelli (2009), the mean group estimator is particularly efficient if dynamic heterogeneity
is present. Therefore, also in our case, it should be preferred to a pooled estimator.
7Beginning of our sample is due to the computation of the Real Potential GDP.
8The fiscal foresight is the phenomenon for which private agents, due to legislative and
implementation lags, can anticipate future movements in government spending previously
announced, so that not accounting for them in the identification of government spending
shocks might give rise to exogeneity problems. See also Leeper et al. (2013) for a theoretical
illustration.
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We simplify the procedure related to the government spending multipliers
computation by dividing all endogenous variables except average taxes by real
potential GDP of the corresponding country. In this way we do not use the log
of variables and therefore avoid potential bias related to ex post conversion to
dollar equivalents of the estimated elasticities.9
We use as interaction term the European Central Bank Shadow Rate
developed by Wu and Xia (2017). It allows us to be more accurate in terms of
inference during the ZLB period. As a matter of fact, after the ZLB is reached,
Wu and Xia (2017) develop a shadow-rate term structure model (SRTSM) to
describe the economic environment with negative interest rates. Since this
rate is available from 2004Q3 onwards, we splice the European Central Bank
Shadow Rate with the Main Refinancing Operations (MRO) rate.10Thanks to
the interaction term we are able to investigate how the government spending
shock affects our variables of interest at the different levels of the interest
rate. On the other hand, when we set a specific value of the interaction term,
our empirical model implies that the shadow rate remains the same for the
20 quarters, corresponding to the horizon over which we calculate impulse
responses. For this reason we investigate the effects of a government spending
shock at different percentiles of the shadow rate, specifically at 5th, 15th and
31.7th percentiles on one hand and 50th percentile of its distribution on the
other hand. We consider the range between the 5th and the 31.7th percentile
as the low interest rate state. In particular, the latter percentile corresponds
to a value of the shadow rate equal to 0.25, which is conventionally considered
9Ex-post conversion require sample averages which migth bias the computation of fiscal
multipliers. This problem is even more acute in nonlinear models, such as the one we are
adopting here. For further details related to these issues see Ramey and Zubairy (2017).
10We choose the MRO rate because it is the most similar rate to the European Central
Bank Shadow Rate developed by Wu and Xia (2017).
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by the literature as the lower bound for monetary policy. Furthermore, we
consider the 50th percentile as the normal time interest rate state.
In order to avoid potential endogeneity problems that might bias our es-
timates, due to reversed causality issues, we use the first lag of the shadow
rate, i.e. srt−1 . We also choose a lag length of L = 1 . We have chosen the
lag length on the base of the Hannan-Quinn(HQ) and Schwarz-Bayes(SBC)
information criteria.
3.2.3 Inference and identification
As in Sá et al. (2014), we start by estimating the structural recursive form
presented in equation 3.1. More precisely:
1. We proceed by estimating the structural model equation by equation
using OLS. We adopt a Bayesian strategy for inference utilizing an unin-
formative independent Normal–Wishart prior, which use a Montecarlo
simulation to recover the posterior distribution of the structural para-
meters.
2. A draw of the posterior is made and evaluated at prespecified values of
the interaction terms.
3. We derive the corresponding reduced form, by pre-multiplying equation
1 for the inverse of Bi,t
4. We use a sign restriction strategy11 to identify an unexpected government
spending shock. More specifically, we follow the same procedure of
Sá et al. (2014), by using the algorithm developed by Rubio-Ramírez
et al. (2010). Defining V dx as the Cholesky decomposition of the reduced
11For more details see Canova and De Nicolò (2002), Faust and Rogers (2003) and Uhlig
(2005), among the others.
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form variance-covariance matrix Σdx obtained in step 3, we draw an
orthonormal matrix Q such that Q′Q = I, from which follows Bd = V dx Q
and Σdx = Bd′Bd = V dx ′Q′QV dx where d indicates a stable draw from the
posterior distributions.12 To achieve identification, the impulse responses
implied by Bd have to satisfy the following two sets of restrictions: a
government spending shock, which raises GDPit and Git for at least four
quarters. Following Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012), in order to
control for anticipation effects, we also identify a forecast government
spending shock, imposing an increase for at least one quarter on the
response of EUFi,t, Git and GDPit (see also table 3.1). Orthogonality
of the two shocks should ensure exogeneity of the government spending
shock.
5. For every 100 draws of the Q matrix which meet our sign restrictions we
save its median value.
6. We repeat step 2 to 5 making 5000 draws from the posterior distributi-
ons and use the median over the 5000 medians obtained as our central
estimate of interest.13
3.2.4 Multipliers
Since we estimate our model in normalized levels, we avoid any concerns related
to the ex-post conversation. On this way, we can compute multipliers following
the approach of Ramey and Zubairy (2017). Specifically, we compute three
types of multipliers. The first is a discrete approximation of the integral of
12As in Sá et al. (2014); Cogley and Sargent (2005); Primiceri (2005), we discard any
explosive draws from the unrestricted posterior.
13Note that we consider the first 10000 parameter draws as burn-in draws.
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Multipliers 2 and 3 are numerical integration computed using Trapezoidal






3.3 Results for Baseline Specification
The impulse response functions for our baseline specification are showed in
Figure 3.1. The four columns show the reactions of our variables of interest
to an unexpected government spending shock when the shadow rate is at 5th,
15th, 31.7th and 50th percentile of its distribution, respectively. Overall, the
responses of our variables of interest are not very persistent. In both states,
government spending reacts strongly on impact, it reaches its peak after two
quarters, and subsequently reverts quite rapidly to its long run level. The
GDP is also very similar among states, even though its reaction seems to be
stronger in the high interest state. However in both states, the responses of
GDP become insignificant after a few quarters. Average taxes are very different
among states: following a government spending shock, they do not rise very
much in the high interest rate, while there is substantially no response in the
low interest rate state. Overall, their behavior suggests that the government
spending shock is mainly deficit financed.
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The government spending multiplier (table 3.2) is quite small when the
interest rate is at the ZLB. Specifically, it ranges between 0.33 and 0.88 at the
ZLB, and from 1.10 and 1.29 away from it.
3.4 Results for Factor-Augmented Specifica-
tion
Since our results can be influenced by the choice we made about variables and
the number of variables is constrained in order to preserve parsimony of the mo-
del, defined by the literature as generic limited information problem which can
give rise to nonfundamentalness of the shocks (for further details see Forni et al.
(2009), Forni and Gambetti (2011))14, we develop a FAIPVAR model. As a
matter of fact, by augmenting our model with principal components as proxies
for the unobserved factors affecting most of the macroeconomic variables, we
incorporate in our model a large informational dataset and contemporaneously
preserve the parsimony of the model.15
As in Di Serio et al. (2017), we implement a two-step estimation procedure
similar to Bernanke et al. (2005). First, we use the method of principal
components to extract summarized information from a large informational
dataset.16 Then, we add the three factors extracted to Yt.17 Thus, our
FAIVAR model has the following vector of endogenous variables:
14Note that by adding the variable EUFit to our specifications, we have already accounted
for another kind of limited information problem, which is the fiscal foresight.
15For further details about these two issues see Di Serio et al. (2017) and Fragetta and
Gasteiger (2014).
16For this purpose, we downloaded (if available) from Thomson Reuters Datastream
Economics database, the corresponding variables listed in Fragetta and Gasteiger (2014)
for all ten countries considered in our analysis. In this way, our informational dataset
includes 418 series.
17To establish the number of factors to extract, we use the Bai and Ng (2007)
ICp2 information criterion.
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Yi,t = [EUFi,t, Gi,t, GDPi,t, Ti,t, Ft]′ (3.8)
where Ft is a 1× 3 vector which is common to all countries, but that have
a different impact for each country and allows to capture potential spillover
effects between countries.
The resulting IRFs are showed in figure 3.2. The first important difference
we observe is related to the behavior of the government spending response. As
we can see, it is stronger and more persistent in the low interest rate state.
Moreover, at the ZLB, GDP increases a lot on impact, then reverts smoothly
to its long run level. On the other hand, in the high interest rate state, GDP
response becomes insignificant after a few quarters.
The government spending multiplier (table 3.2) is almost equal among
states: it ranges between 1.08 and 1.41 in the low interest rate state and
between 1.26 and 1.39 in the high interest rate state.
Although these findings do not provide evidences of relevant differences
among states, they are in line with theoretical studies which support New-
Keynesian government spending effects. Among the others, Coenen et al.
(2012) use the European Central Bank’s New Area-Wide Model (NAWM) and
find multipliers greater than one, as in our case. On the other hand, these
findings are in contradiction with Cwik and Wieland (2011), Burriel et al.
(2010) and Forni et al. (2009) who find government spending multipliers for
the Euro Area below unit.
In addition, comparing these findings to results we get from the baseline
specification, we can conclude that the limited information problem, related
to the difference in terms of information set usually considered by the econo-
metrician and the one considered by the economic agents, have a significant
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impact on the results. As a matter of fact, these results prove that our baseline
specification underestimates the government spending multipliers, especially
when the interest rate is at the ZLB.
3.5 Sub-samples Analysis
The results of section 3.4, show very similar multipliers for both high and low
interest rate state. Although these findings broadly support New-Keynesian
predictions, they are somehow in contradiction with the theoretical works
of Christiano et al. (2011), Eggertsson (2010), Woodford (2011), Davig and
Leeper (2011) and Coenen et al. (2012), who find higher multipliers at the
ZLB, ranging from 3 to 5. It may be the case that our results are influenced
by countries which have high level of debt-to-GDP ratio, which may lower the
average value of government spending multipliers, especially at the ZLB.
In this section, we investigate if the reactions of variables of interest may
vary across countries conditioned on their level of debt-to-GDP ratio. For this
purpose, we create two subsets of countries. The first subset includes countries
that have a debt-to-GDP ratio higher than 90% from 2009 on. Basically
this subset includes peripheral countries, with the exclusion of Greece which
joined the Euro Area only in 2001 and for which data have been continuously
revised and with the inclusion of Belgium. The second group is composed by
countries that, during the same period, have a debt-to-GDP ratio lower than
90%. Thus, we name the first subsample, which includes Belgium, Ireland,
Italy, Portugal and Spain, “Peripheral Countries” and the other subsample
as “Core Countries”.
In the next subsections we show results we obtain for the two specifications
described in section 3.2.2 and section 3.4.
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3.5.1 Results for Baseline Specification
Figure 3.3 and 3.5 show IRFs for peripheral and core countries, respectively.
As we can see, there is a huge difference in responses of our variables of interest.
Considering peripheral countries, we can note that the response of government
spending exhibits more or less the same pattern for both states. Government
spending reaches its peak after very few quarters for both states, and it seems a
little bit more persistent in the high interest rate state. GDP response mimics
the behavior of government spending but it reverts more slowly to zero at the
ZLB. Government spending multiplier results are slightly higher at the ZLB,
ranging between 1.38 and 2.05, while it ranges between 1.37 and 1.46 away
from it. It is also important to point out that the response of average tax is
insignificant at the ZLB, while it is quite strong and significant away from it.
Core countries show huge responses of variables of interest to a government
spending shock. The responses of government spending and GDP show very
similar patterns between the two different states, even if the IRFs away from
the ZLB seem to be more persistent for both variables. They are also very
large compared to peripheral countries results: at the ZLB, the government
spending multiplier ranges between 3.01 and 3.90, while away from the ZLB
it ranges from 4.18 to 4.21. Also in this case, the response of average taxes is
insignificant at the ZLB, and not so huge in the high interest rate state.
3.5.2 Results for Factor-Augmented Specification
Figure 3.4 show IRFs for peripheral countries. As we can see, Government
Spending reacts on impact in the same way for both states. However, its
response is more persistent in the low interest rate state. On the other hand,
the responses of GDP, is slightly larger in the high interest rate state, although,
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the GDP response becomes insignificant after a few quarters for both states.
The corresponding multipliers are somehow in contradiction with the results
of section 3.5.1. As a matter of fact, table 3.3 shows multipliers between 0.82
and 1.18 at the ZLB, and between 1.29 and 1.37 away from the ZLB.
As shown in figure 3.6, results for core countries show generally a huge
response of variables of interest to an increase in government spending. The
responses of government spending have substantially the same intensity among
states. However, the behavior of GDP is very different among states. It
mimics the response of government spending at the ZLB, while it exhibits
a hump-shaped pattern away from the ZLB. Average taxes rises hugely on
impact, especially at the ZLB.
Once again, the government spending multipliers (Table 3.4) are in contra-
diction with the baseline results: it ranges between 3.11 and 3.54 in the low
interest rate state, and between 2.69 and 2.87 in the high interest rate state.
3.5.3 Further Considerations
We can make three considerations from the results we get in section 3.5.1 and
3.5.2. First and foremost, our results support the theoretical works of Su-
therland (1997) and Perotti (1999), which predict that a government spending
shock is even more effective if the average value of debt-to-GDP ratio is low.
Considering the factor augmented specifications, the government spending
multiplier for core countries ranges between 2.87 and 3.54, while it ranges
between 0.82 and 1.37 for countries with high debt levels (regardless if it was
caused by the crisis or not). Our results are also qualitatively similar to the
empirical works of Ilzetzki et al. (2013), Kirchner et al. (2010) and Nickel and
Tudyka (2014).
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Second, the results of section 3.5.2 show lower multipliers for peripheral
countries at the ZLB. This might be due to the stronger negative effect that
the higher debt-to-GDP ratio have on this subset of economies, with respect
to positive potential effect at the ZLB predicted by part of the literature. In
fact, we find for core countries a higher multipliers at the ZLB. Therefore, this
might explain the magnitude of the government spending multipliers obtained
for the full sample.
Third, we point out that with this additional exercise we are aiming to
find qualitative differences between the government spending multipliers at
different levels of the debt-to-GDP ratio, since in this analysis we are missing
an important common factor: monetary policy. Therefore we tend to consider
the results shown in sections 3.3 and 3.4 as more reliable.18
3.6 Conclusions
This paper tried to infer on what are the consequences of a rise (decrease) in
government spending for countries belonging to the Euro Area. In order to
identify an unexpected government spending shock, we use an Interacted Panel
VAR model utilizing a sign restrictions identifying approach. We consider
ten countries belonging to the Euro Area (which represents 95.6% of the
EA-19 Total GDP) developing two different specifications: one with variables
commonly used in the literature, and a more robust specification with a larger
dataset, which allows us to avoid an important limited information problem. In
both specifications we use the European Commission forecasts of government
expenditure to account for fiscal foresight.
18Computing average GDP which take into account both the cross sectional and time
dimension for the full sample, we find that all together represent the 95.6% of the EA-19
Total GDP.
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The first part of our analysis focused on the size of the government spending
multipliers for different levels of the interest rate. Specifically, we tried to
answer the following question: is the government spending multiplier at the
ZLB larger than in normal times? The baseline specification suggests that the
answer is no. We find very low multipliers at the ZLB ranging between 0.33
and 0.88, while they are above unit away from the ZLB, ranging between 1.10
and 1.29. However, these results might be biased due to the few variables
considered. For this reason, we have also considered a factor augmented
Interacted Panel VAR, where it is possible to take into account a larger amount
of information. Considering results obtained using the FAIPVAR model, we
find very similar multipliers among states: they ranges between 1.08 and
1.41 at the ZLB and between 1.26 and 1.39 away from it. Overall, we can
conclude that these findings are in line with New-Keynesian theoretical studies
which argue that a raise in government spending leads to an effects on GDP
greater than one. However, these results seems to not support the theoretical
predictions of Christiano et al. (2011), Eggertsson (2010), Woodford (2011),
Davig and Leeper (2011) and Coenen et al. (2012), who find higher multipliers
at the ZLB. Our interpretation is that our findings may be influenced by a
subset of countries that experienced high level of debt, which we show to
have a depressive effect on the multipliers. Our work, which is not meant to
be completely exhaustive, has shown how important is to take into account
potential nonlinearity and different structural characteristics when computing
fiscal multipliers. Other structural characteristics such as the heterogeneity of
labor markets in setting wages, or different taxation in countries belonging to
the Euro area might potentially reveal positive or negative effects on the fiscal
multipliers that the policy makers might take into account.
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Our dataset is composed of quarterly data and goes from 2000q2 to 2015q4. We
consider ten out of eleven countries which joined the Eurozone when it came
into existence: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy,
Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. According to Auerbach and Gorodnichenko
(2013), we exclude Luxembourg because it is a small economy which exhibits
large and volatile changes in government spending series.
Our variables of interest are Gross Domestic Product, Total General Go-
vernment Revenue and Final Consumption Expenditure of Government. All
the variables of interest are downloaded from the Eurostat database available
on Thomson Reuters Datastream Economics database. We transform Gross
Domestic Product and Final consumption expenditure of Government in real
terms using GDP implicit price deflator. Then we normalize them by diving
by real potential GDP. We also divide Total General Government Revenue by
Gross Domestic Product to generate the average taxes series. The details of
the Real Potential GDP computation are described in appendix 3.A.1.
We use in our specifications the forecast of the annualized growth of Govern-
ment Consumption Expenditure made available by the European Commission.
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Then we normalize these series by subtracting to it the annualized growth rate
of real potential GDP.
3.A.1 Computation of Real Potential GDP
In order to compute the Real Potential GDP series we use the Hamilton (2017)
filter to recover the cyclical component of Real GDP and successively subtract
to the latter the resulting series. As discussed by Hamilton (2017), his filter
should be preferred to the HP filter because the latter exhibits a persistence in
the cyclical component which is far from from the underlying data generating
process.






(yt − gt)2 + λ̈×
T∑
t=−1
[(gt − gt−1)− (gt−1 − gt−2)]2
 (3.9)
By setting λ̈, which is the smoothness penalty, we choose the degree in
which it is close to the data. Considering quarterly data and t far away from
the start or end of the sample (at least 15 years), we can approximate the
cyclical component ct = yt − g∗t by the following equation:
ct =
λ̈(1− L)4
F (L) yt+2 (3.10)
As we can see, this formula generates a stationary series if the fourth
differences of our series is stationary. Anyhow, as demonstrated by De Jong
and Sakarya (2016), it can be the case the non stationarity may come from
the begin or the end of the sample. Moreover, Phillips and Jin (2015) claim
that the HP filter may not remove the trend even if the series is I (1 ). Cogley
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and Sargent (2005) consider a random walk yt = yt−1 + εt, where the first
differences are unpredictable and show that equation 3.10 can be written as:
ct =
λ̈(1− L)3
F (L) εt+2 (3.11)
By setting λ̈ = 1600 (the usual choice for quarterly data), the HP filter
leads to a random εt and a cycle, which either predict the future as a function
of future errors and is predictable as a function of past errors.
Hamilton (2017) highlights that the coefficients of F(L)−1 depend on the
value of λ̈. Consequently, it does not reflect the data generating process, and
for this reason there might be persistence of the cycle. In addition, since
the filter depends on the future realizations, its ability to predict the future
is questionable. He proposes to make a forecast of yt+h, which is made two
years in advance and which is based on current and past values. Considering
quarterly data, h should be equal to 8 and p = 4 . The resulting forecast error
would be taken as the cycle at time t + h of the probably not stationary series.
As a matter of fact, Hamilton (2017) shows that the main reason of most
of macroeconomic and financial variables wrong predictions is due to cyclical
component. Moreover, as shown by Den Haan (2000), the forecast error should
be stationary for many nonstationary processes.
Considering the population linear projection of quarterly data,
yt+h = β0 + β1yt + β2yt−1 + β3yt−2 + β4yt−3 + vt+h (3.12)
Hamilton (2017) shows that if we want to estimate the cycle at time h,
and so vt+h , it is not necessary to know the nature of nonstationarity or to
have the correct forecasting model. For example, if we have an I(2) series,
and considering p > d, equation 3.12 (which have p = 4 ) uses two coefficients
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to get stationary residuals and the other coefficients will be defined by the
parameters which characterize the stationary variable vt+h.
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Tables
Table 3.1: Sign Restrictions for Identifying the Government Spending Shock
Shock 1 Shock 2
Variable Sign Periods Sign Periods
EUFit + 1
Git + 1 + 4
GDPit + 1 + 4
Tit
Table 3.2: Multipliers Full Sample.a
Mi xt = srt−1
5th 15th 31.7th 50th
M1 0.88 0.55 0.63 1.29
M2 0.68 0.33 0.41 1.10
M3 0.68 0.34 0.42 1.11
xt = srt−1 and Ft
5th 15th 31.7th 50th
M1 1.41 1.24 1.22 1.39
M2 1.29 1.11 1.08 1.26
M3 1.26 1.10 1.09 1.29
aMultipliersMi ∈ {1, 2, 3} are calculated as outlined in 3.2.4
116
3.The Government Spending Multiplier at the ZLB: Evidence from the E.A.
Table 3.3: Multipliers Peripheral Countries.a
Mi xt = srt−1
5th 15th 31.7th 50th
M1 2.05 1.65 1.46 1.46
M2 2.01 1.59 1.38 1.37
M3 2.01 1.59 1.39 1.38
xt = srt−1 and Ft
5th 15th 31.7th 50th
M1 0.98 1.14 1.18 1.37
M2 0.82 1.00 1.05 1.29
M3 0.83 1.01 1.06 1.31
aPeripheral Countries includes Belgium, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain.
MultipliersMi ∈ {1, 2, 3} are calculated as outlined in 3.2.4.
Table 3.4: Multipliers Core Countries.a
Mi xt = srt−1
5th 15th 31.7th 50th
M1 3.90 3.22 3.15 4.21
M2 3.74 3.05 3.01 4.18
M3 3.74 3.05 3.01 4.18
xt = srt−1 and Ft
5th 15th 31.7th 50th
M1 3.54 3.51 3.26 2.87
M2 3.39 3.38 3.11 2.69
M3 3.39 3.39 3.12 2.71
aCore Countries includes Austria, Finland, France, Germany and Netherlands.
MultipliersMi ∈ {1, 2, 3} are calculated as outlined in 3.2.4.
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